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ARTICLES
Evidence’s #MeToo Moment
ANÍBAL ROSARIO-LEBRÓN *
The #MeToo movement has drawn attention to the prevalence of sexual and gender-based violence. But more importantly, it has exposed how society discounts the testimony
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of women. This Article unfolds how this credibility discounting is reinforced in our evidentiary system through the use
of character for untruthfulness evidence to impeach victims.
Specifically, through defense attorneys’ practice of impeaching sexual and gender-based violence victims’ character for truthfulness as a way to introduce functional evidence
of credibility biases regarding the trustworthiness of sexual
and gender-based violence victims and the plausibility of
their testimonies. The Article further shows a correlation between the poor performance of our legal system in redressing the harms associated with sexual and gender-based violence and our evidentiary rules. Accordingly, the Article advocates reforming the use of character for untruthfulness evidence and proposes a rule that attempts to temper the prejudicial effects caused by long-held credibility biases against
sexual and gender-based violence victims with a well-established impeachment tradition, constitutional protections,
and judicial efficiency. It does so in hopes that the #MeToo
movement becomes a catalyst in the judicial response
against sexual and gender-based violence.

Moran, Meaghan Goldstein, and Keigan Vannoy, for their insightful edition, dedication, and loving work on this Article.
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#FEM2: INTRODUCTION
Well the icecaps are melting pretty fast and the change here [in
workplace sexual harassment] seems to be glacially slow. But I will
say, that if we do nothing the change is not gonna come. 1

LastWeekTonight, Workplace Sexual Harassment: Last Week Tonight
with John Oliver (HBO), YOUTUBE (July 29, 2018), https://www.youtube. com/
watch?v= dHiAls8loz4 [hereinafter Last Week Tonight with John Oliver] (Professor Anita Hill discussing the changes our judicial system has experienced in redressing sexual harassment and SGBV at 28:15–28:30).
1
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Historically, in sexual and gender-based violence (“SGBV”)
cases, 2 women have been doubly victimized. 3 With the rise of social
The term sexual and gender-based violence cases will be used in this Article as an umbrella term for cases in which the majority of victims are women and
its violence has a gender or sexual component such as sexual harassment, rape,
sexual assault, intimate partner violence, stealthing, upskirting, and similar aggressions.
[SGBV] refers to harm or threat of harm perpetrated against a
person based on her/his gender. It is rooted in unequal power
relationships between men and women; thus, women are more
commonly affected. It is often used interchangeably with “violence against women” and can include sexual, physical, economic and psychological abuse. SGBV manifests in various
forms including physical, emotional and sexual violence, sexual exploitation, discrimination and harassment.
ALYS M. WILLMAN & CRYSTAL CORMAN, WORLD BANK, SEXUAL AND GENDERBASED VIOLENCE: WHAT IS THE WORLD BANK DOING, AND WHAT HAVE WE
LEARNED? A STRATEGIC REVIEW 5 (2013), https://openknowledge.
worldbank.org/handle/10986/16733. “This does not mean that all acts against a
woman are gender-based violence, or that all victims of gender-based violence
are female.” Definitions of Sexual and Gender-Based Violence, NEW
HUMANITARIAN (Sept. 1, 2004), http://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/feature/2004/09/01/definitions-sexual-and-gender-based-violence. Men who do not
conform to society’s views of masculinity could be victims of SGBV. Id.
Although reliable figures are difficult to compile, it is estimated that between
1993 and 2001 eighty-five percent of intimate partner violence victims were
women. CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE,
INTIMATE
PARTNER
VIOLENCE,
1993-2001
(2003),
https://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf. Similarly, it is estimated that less than
two percent of men in the United States—as opposed to twenty percent of
women—will be raped. See Get Statistics, NAT’L SEXUAL VIOLENCE RES. CTR.,
https://www.nsvrc.org/node/4737 (last visited Oct. 8, 2019). The proportion of
reported cases of rape and sexual assault in the United Sates show a similar trend,
with a ratio of about 1:10 (men to women). See Number of Forcible Rape and
Sexual Assault Victims in the United States from 1993 to 2017, by Sex, STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/251923/usa--reported-forcible-rape-cases-bygender/ (last updated Apr. 29, 2019); Number of Rape or Sexual Assault Victims
in the United States per Year from 2000 to 2017, by Gender, STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/642458/rape-and-sexual-assault-victims-inthe-us- by-gender/ (last updated Apr. 29, 2019). The pattern repeats itself in cases
of sexual harassment. See, e.g., Charges Alleging Sex-Based Harassment
(Charges Filed with EEOC) FY 2010 - FY 2018, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/sexual_harassment_new.cfm (last visited Oct. 10, 2019) [hereinafter Charges Alleging Sex-Based Harassment]. The EEOC reports that in the last nine years males
are on average 16.8% of the complainants. See id.
2
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awareness about the embodiment of patriarchal norms in our legal
system, we reformed our probative and substantive laws to no longer
require corroborative testimony, 4 in an attempt to put somewhat of
a stop to victim-blaming and slut-shaming in court. 5
Today, the #MeToo movement, originated by Tarana Burke, is
raising social awareness about rape culture and credibility biases
against SGBV victims. 6 As a result, men have been forced to
acknowledge their patriarchal behavior and resign from positions of
power. 7 Nevertheless, reporting, prosecution, and conviction rates
remain well below acceptable levels and have even fallen. 8
This Article argues that, while some of the discounting of narratives denounced by the #MeToo movement has been partially eradicated from the judicial process, 9 there is a correlation between the
Consequently, although males are also targets of SGBV, throughout the Article
feminine pronouns will be used to refer to victims, except in the proposed rule
that will use gender-neutral language to maintain its constitutionality. See infra
Sections IV.B, V.B.
It is also important to stress that, although this Article focuses on how gender
intersects with credibility, understanding how gender intersects with race, religion, class, and other identities is critical to addressing patterns and forms of sexual and gender-based violence. See, e.g., Lisa A. Crooms, Speaking Partial Truths
and Preserving Power: Deconstructing White Supremacy, Patriarchy, and the
Rape Corroboration Rule in the Interest of Black Liberation, 40 HOW. L.J. 459,
474–75 (1997) (discussing allegations of rape when made by and against African
Americans); Nesa E. Wasarhaley et al., The Impact of Gender Stereotypes on Legal Perceptions of Lesbian Intimate Partner Violence, 32 J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 635, 651–53 (2015) (discussing credibility discounting of same-sex
couples).
3
See infra notes 26–30 and accompanying text.
4
See Tyler J. Buller, Fighting Rape Culture with Noncorroboration Instructions, 53 TULSA L. REV. 1, 13–15 (2017).
5
See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
6
Stephanie Zacharek et al., Person of the Year 2017: The Silence Breakers,
TIME (Dec. 18, 2017), http://time.com/time-person-of-the-year-2017-silencebreakers/.
7
See Audrey Carlsen et al., #MeToo Brought Down 201 Powerful Men.
Nearly Half of Their Replacements Are Women., N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/10/23/us/metoo-replacements.html (last updated Oct.
29, 2018).
8
See The Criminal Justice System: Statistics, RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NAT’L
NETWORK, https://www.rainn.org/statistics/criminal-justice-system (last visited
Oct. 10, 2019).
9
See, e.g., Buller, supra note 4, at 13–15.
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poor performance of our legal system in addressing SGBV cases and
our evidentiary rules. Specifically, this Article posits that neutral
rules regarding the impeachment of a witnesses’ character for untruthfulness are used in practice by attorneys to discount victims’
testimonies through credibility biases based on trustworthiness and
testimony plausibility. 10
As a possible solution, this Article advocates enacting impeachment rules that would prevent attorneys from using societal narratives about victims’ perceived lack of credibility and working them
in as part of the defense. The proposed rule, 11 based on the Federal
Rules of Evidence (“FRE”), attempts to temper the prejudicial effects caused by credibility biases with a long-standing tradition of
impeaching witnesses with evidence of character for untruthfulness,
constitutional protections, and judicial efficiency. The Rule provides for different balancing tests depending on the type of character
for untruthfulness evidence and lists concrete factors to aid the court
in SGBV cases when weighing the probative value of the character
for untruthfulness evidence against its prejudicial effects.
The Article opens with a short story that sheds light on some of
the discounting that SGBV victims often experience when they
come to court to vindicate their grievances. 12 The Article then explores how these unjust experiences are part of an evidentiary system that, through the impeachment of victims’ character for truthfulness, discounts women’s voices by not gatekeeping credibility biases from SGBV trials. 13 After describing this phenomenon, this Article presents how SGBV continues to be a pressing issue in our society and how the low reporting, prosecution, and conviction rates
correlate with the undue exploitation of credibility biases in trials. 14
Next, it explores the current evidentiary landscape in the United
States regarding the impeachment of SGBV victims with character
for untruthfulness evidence and the costs of keeping an evidentiary
system that reinforces SGBV through credibility biases. 15 After the
problem is explained, the Article includes a model impeachment
10
11
12
13
14
15

See infra Part II.
See infra Section IV.B.
See infra Part I.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Section IV.A.
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rule, as well as a commentary explaining the rule and its application. 16 Finally, the Article discusses the benefits and disadvantages
of implementing the rule. 17
I.
#METOO: A NOT CREDIBLE WITNESS
I dreaded that moment. Their silent treatment. Their faces of disappointment. The look in their eyes letting me know that I have
failed them.
I was so terrified of that moment. I could feel the chills going
through my spine. It was worse than the punishment itself. The look
on their faces said it all. I lied. I misbehaved. I deserved no mercy.
I went all throughout my childhood trying to avoid that feeling.
Yet, as I grew older, I kept running into it.
It was different for sure. It was no longer my parents. It was then
my friends’, my teachers’, and my colleagues’ turn. Even though I
hadn’t done anything wrong, it felt like I had. Like I was a child and
had broken an old vase in the living room. It still felt like I had lied,
like I had misbehaved. But the only thing broken was me.
If a high school teacher made unsolicited sexual advances and I
said something about it, I’d have to respond to a myriad of questions.
Did I misunderstand the situation? Had I asked for it? Was it my
fault for staying alone with him? Was I deflecting? Was I lying because I did not get the highest grade? Was I making a big deal out
of nothing?
I quickly learned to keep silent. If I did not want to be made a
liar, it was better to shut up. If I wanted a future, it was better to let
it go than to taint my reputation.
I thought I had learned all the tricks. Never be alone with your
boss. Never walk by yourself late at night. Make sure you know the
men you go out with well. Ask other women what they’ve heard.
Yet, here I am again. Three decades later, feeling those same
chills.
I thought this time was going to be different. They told me to
break the silence. They told me to tell my story. They told me there
were other women like me.
But the look in their eyes said it all. The foreman, the jurors, the
judge.
16
17

See infra Sections IV.B–IV.D.
See infra Part V.
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I told the truth. It didn’t matter. I cooperated with the police. It
didn’t matter. I came forward. It didn’t matter.
The look was there. Lingering, like his beatings. I had lied. I
misbehaved. I deserved no mercy.
Initially, I did not intend to be in court for the verdict. But my
family and friends convinced me otherwise. They said I should keep
my head high. However, I knew from the moment I took the stand
that he was going to walk.
This trial was never about him. It was about me not coming forward promptly, me keeping silence in my own hell, me lying to keep
appearances, me putting on makeup, me not stopping going to work.
It was about whatever it was that I did that they could not understand.
This case was not about how many times he hit me, how many
times he yelled at me, or how he made me feel. It was not about how
many times he pushed me against the wall or raped me.
It was about the people who didn’t know about it. The people
who didn’t see it. The people I didn’t tell about it.
It was about him saying that he is not the kind of man that would
do such things, but I am the kind of woman who would make such
things up. It was about me being unreliable, unstable, and perhaps
scorned.
What type of car do you have, Jennifer?
As soon as his attorney asked that question, I knew it was over
for me.
An Audi. Why?
Objection, your Honor! The prosecutor intervened.
Your Honor, this question is related to the credibility of the witness.
Your Honor, I fail to see how this is related to the credibility of
the victim.
Your Honor, if I may?

10
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Sidebar please, the judge commanded.
No one was supposed to hear what they were discussing, but I
did. His attorney was arguing how he had evidence that I maliciously lied in a loan application and that it will show my character
for untruthfulness. Since all the State had was my testimony against
that of my ex, the information was extremely relevant. The prosecutor did not even reply, and the judge just nodded and said: “Get to
the point right away.”
Jennifer, you took a loan for that car, no?
Yes, I did.
Isn’t it true that you lied in the loan application?
I don’t know what you are talking about. That was like six years
ago.
Do you remember completing a loan application to buy the car?
Yes.
Do you remember lying about your income?
I don’t think so.
The attorney kept looking at his papers, like he was searching
for something. I started wondering if he had my loan application
with him and was about to show it to the court.
Are you sure that you didn’t write that you made 45k when you
applied for the loan? He kept looking.
I might have.
But that was not your income at the time?
I think a friend told me to . . .
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I didn’t ask you about what your “friend” told you. I asked you
about what you wrote in the application. Did you write 45k when
you were making less than that?
Yes.
So, you lied, correct?
I guess you can say I did. I followed my friend’s advice.
But the application was in your name, no?
Yes.
You were not married to my client at the time?
No.
But you made everyone think you were.
Excuse me?
Objection, your Honor! Relevance? The prosecutor interjected.
Your Honor, we are trying to get at the credibility of this witness.
Overruled. The judge disinterestedly intervened.
I will repeat my question. At that time, six years ago, did you go
by Mrs. Johnson or Miss Jones?
I don’t understand.
Did your manager at your job call you Mrs. Johnson?
Well . . . the manager of the office knew Mark, and he thought
that we were married. I did not want to give any explanations
about us. It was easier to do that.
So, when it is easier for you, you lie?
No. I did not say that.
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So, when you don’t want to give explanations you lie?
No. I did not say that.
But you lied to your manager, no?
No.
Well . . . legally you were Miss Jones, no?
Yes.
And you referred to yourself as Mrs. Johnson with your manager, correct?
Yes. We were not married at the time, but we were living together, so people referred to me as Mrs. Johnson.
But that was not your legal name, right?
No.
So, you were lying, no?
I wouldn’t say that.
Let’s go back to the car. You did not tell Mark that you were
buying a car, right?
No.
Of course! As you testified, he allegedly wouldn’t let you buy
even a cell phone, so he wouldn’t have let you buy a car, am I
correct?
I don’t think he would’ve. No.
But you did apply for a loan, right?
Yes.
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So, you took a loan behind Mark’s back, behind the back of the
man you called your “husband”?
It wasn’t behind his back.
But he didn’t know?
No, he did not know.
I could see the face of the lady in the second row of the jury box
and I knew exactly what she was thinking. “This woman is a liar.
Look at her. She doesn’t look like a victim at all.” I should’ve listened to my mom when she told me that no one was going to believe
me if I look like nothing had happened. “Victims don’t dress like
you do, Jen. They look sad. You look too attractive.” And then, all
a sudden, the attorney went for what I thought was the final blow.
You eventually married my client, right?
Yes.
In fact, you are still married to him?
Yes. I’m in the process . . .
Now. Mrs. Johnson, did you recently take a pregnancy test?
Objection! The State’s attorney jumped from her chair.
Again, the attorneys came to the bench. This time the prosecutor
was more forceful in her defense. She insisted that the pregnancy
test had nothing to do with the case. That it was impermissible to
use that type of evidence. His attorney insisted that it was to prove
my deceitful character, not to pry into my sexual life. The judge
simply said, “I’ll allow it.”
Please answer my question, Mrs. Johnson. Did you take recently
a pregnancy test?
Yes. I went to my doctor’s and she ordered one for me.

14
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It has been more than six months since you have lived with my
client, correct?
That’s correct.
But you are still married to him, no?
Yes, I am . . . We are in the middle of the divorce process.
In that divorce you are asking for alimony, no?
Yes. I think my attorney asked for it.
And for full custody of your children?
Yes.
Now, Jennifer, did you try to kill yourself?
I expected the question.
Yes. It was a difficult time. I was depressed.
Did you think about your children?
Objection?!
Sustained.
Apologies, your Honor. Were your depressed or are you still depressed?
Well . . . I’m still in treatment. As I said, it has been a difficult
time.
And when you tried to take your life, it was just a few days after
your relationship with Mark ended, no?
Yes. But that wasn’t . . .
In fact, he left you, no?
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That’s right.
But just two weeks after your suicide attempt, you let Mark into
your house.
No. He showed up.
Thanks. In your testimony, you mentioned that around that time
you decided not to have anything else to do with Mark, right?
Yes.
But you let him in.
I didn’t have the strength to . . .
You did not have the strength to call the police?
No, I did. But I did not mean that.
Your kids were not with you, no?
No. They were with my parents.
So, you did not call the police when Mark showed up?
No.
Even though you alleged that he had hit you many times before,
right?
No, I did not call the police at that moment.
And no one could verify that he has hit you before, right?
No one was at our house when he hit me.
And you did not call the police when he showed up even though
you allege that he raped you in the past.
No.

16
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And you never told anyone about him raping you before until
this trial, right?
That’s correct.
Not even your mom?
No.
Or your friends?
No.
In fact, you told the police when you made the report that you
have never been the victim of domestic violence. No?
Yes. I meant that . . .
Just a simple yes or no will do. In fact, you told your friends and
family how happy you were with Mark?
Yes. I didn’t want people to know . . .
And on Facebook, you were always talking about all the nice
things Mark would do for you?
Yes. As I told you, I did not want people to know.
You never said on Facebook that he raped you, no?
That’s not something you post on Facebook.
So, that was a no?
Yes. That was a no.
And you had sex with him that night he “showed up” at your
house, no?
No. He raped me.
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But you did not have any bruising on your arms when the police
came?
No.
Or anywhere on your body, isn’t that correct?
That’s correct. I did not have any bruising. That doesn’t mean
he did not rape me.
I could see in the foreman’s eyes. He was certain that I was lying
because I never shared with anyone that he was abusing me. He
thought that I was unstable. He was sure that I had sex voluntarily
with him and that I was being vindictive and jealous because he left.
So, you called the police when he was in the bathroom and he
was about to leave, right?
Yes. That was when I . . .
And the police took you to the hospital, right?
Yes. I was very anxious.
And in the hospital, they administered a rape kit on you, no?
No. I did not say, at that moment, that he had raped me.
So, this is the first time you have told someone that my client,
your husband, who you let in your house, allegedly raped you?
Yes.
Now, my client went to check on you after your suicide attempt,
no?
That’s what he said when he showed up at my doorstep.
No more questions, your Honor.
Then it came down to the closing.

18

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:1

As the attorney went into his argument, I remembered the bedtime stories my mom used to tell me as a child about how the wolf
came, and no one believed the shepherd boy. That day, I was the
shepherd. But this time I wasn’t being believed not for what I said
but for what I did not say.
“‘Heaven has no rage like love to hatred turned, nor hell a fury
like a woman scorned.’ 18 We are here today because of Jennifer’s
scorn.” The defense attorney yelled. “She is a person who would lie
when she sees fit. You heard her tell you how she lied about the
relationship she had with my client. She pretended to be his wife.
And after getting what she wanted, when he decided to call it quits,
she lied again, like she did in her loan application. She is just looking
to ruin this honest man’s life. The man who, before leaving, she was
telling everybody how well he treated her.
There is no victim in this case. Or yes, there is one: my client. A
man whose life is about to get ruined because of this woman’s lies.
She is trying to ruin Mark’s life by lying. Just like she told you she
does when she doesn’t want to give explanations, when it’s easier
for her to get what she wants, when she really wants something that
she can’t have like a car, my client, or money. Like she lied here in
court when she told you that my client wouldn’t let her buy a cell
phone when she was buying things more expensive and less easily
concealable. Things that—if it were true that my client wanted to
control her—she would not have been able to have. But we all know
that she was lying about the cell phone, as she was lying about the
punches, the restrictions, and the insults.
We all know that she was lying about being raped. Who lets an
abuser come into her house when the relationship has ended? Who
doesn’t tell the police she has been raped? No one. It’s a lie. A lie
from an unstable woman, a woman who hasn’t been able to deal
with her depression.
And if you have any doubts, look at the other witnesses the State
brought. Who does she have to support her story? Her parents. Her
friends. People who would do anything for her. People who did not
like my client in the first place. People who were not present at any
of the alleged instances of abuse. People who, as Mrs. Johnson did,
lied to you.
18
WILLIAM CONGREVE, THE MOURNING BRIDE act 3, sc. 2. (original spelling
has been modernized).
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But you know better than that. You know my client is incapable
of the atrocities that he has been accused of. And you know Jennifer.
You know she is capable of lying to get her way.”
But I did not “get my way.” He did.
I just kept my head high.
II. #BELIEVEHER: DISCOUNTING SGBV VICTIMS WITH
CHARACTER FOR UNTRUTHFULNESS EVIDENCE
All wickedness is but little to the wickedness of a woman. 19
Jennifer’s story is more common than what we would like to
think. In fact, her story is based on a fairly publicized intimate partner violence case in Puerto Rico between a then-legislator and
hisspouse. 20 As both fiction and reality demonstrate, discounting
Ecclesiasticus, 25:19 (King James).
Liza Yajaira Rivera Colón pressed charges against her husband, attorney
and legislator Luis Farinacci, for domestic violence. See Esposa del legislador
Luis Farinacci Morales relata patrón violencia doméstica [Wife of Legislator
Luis Farinacci Morales Recounts Pattern of Domestic Violence], PRIMERA HORA
(Aug. 8, 2010, 12:00 AM), https://www.primerahora.com/noticias/puerto-rico
/nota/esposadellegisladorluisfarinaccimoralesrelatapatronvioleciadomestica-409
310/. The defense attorney in the case, Pablo Colón, impeached Liza Yajaira’s
credibility to argue that the accusations were aimed at destroying his client. Cuestionan credibilidad de esposa de Farinacci [Credibility of Farinacci’s Wife Called into Question], EL NUEVO DÍA, https://www.elnuevodia.com/noticias/politica/nota/cuestionancredibilidaddeesposadefarinacci-811028/ (last updated Nov.
3, 2010, 6:04 PM); Liza Yajaira niega que quisiera destruir a Farinacci [Liza
Yajaira Denies Attempting to Destroy Farinacci], EL NUEVO DÍA,
https://www.elnuevodia.com/noticias/politica/nota/lizayajairaniegaquequisieradestruirafarinacci-997334/ (last updated June 21, 2011, 7:12 PM); No culpable el
exrepresentante Farinacci de violencia doméstica [Former Representative Farinacci Acquitted of Domestic Violence], EL NUEVO DÍA, https://www.elnuevodia.com/noticias/politica/nota/noculpableelexrepresentantefarinaccideviolenciadomestica-1008503/ (last updated June 5, 2011, 10:40 PM).
Liza Yajaira’s case inspired this Article and my first reflection on this topic in
2011. See Aníbal Rosario Lebrón, Atando los cabos sueltos del machismo en el
sistema judicial de Puerto Rico [Tying up the Loose Ends of Machismo in the
Judicial System of Puerto Rico], DERECHOALDERECHO (Aug. 17, 2011), http://derechoalderecho.org/2011/08/17/atando-los-cabos-sueltos-del-machismo-en-elsistema-judicial-de-puerto-rico/. After proposing a reform to the Puerto Rican
Rules of Evidence to address the impeachment of domestic violence victims, I
decided to research deeper the use of character for untruthfulness evidence in the
context of SGBV victims. See Aníbal Rosario Lebrón, Scorned Law: Rethinking
19
20
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victims in SGBV cases by impeaching their credibility is part of a
larger defense strategy to deny the charges or to boost other defenses. 21
This is not a new occurrence. Our legal system has a long patriarchal history of discounting women’s credibility during trials and
adversely affecting the fair prosecution of crimes committed against
them. 22 For example, in rape cases, our legal system has historically
required corroboration testimony, 23 prompt outcry, 24 and cautionary

Evidentiary Rules in Cases of Gender-Based Violence, CONCURRING OPINIONS
(Feb. 16, 2014), https://concurringopinions.com/archives/2014/02/scorned-lawrethinking-evidentiary-rules-in-cases-of-gender-based-violence.html. The ideas
from those early reflections culminated in this Article.
21
See ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RAPE AND THE CULTURE OF THE COURTROOM
19–21 (1999) (discussing how The Little Mermaid is an example of a tale built
upon intergender sexual behaviors that illustrates a cultural rape narrative of
women lying about rape); Carolyn Copps Hartley, “He Said, She Said”: The Defense Attack of Credibility in Domestic Violence Felony Trials, 7 VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 510, 522–34 (2001) (describing study of strategies used by the
defense attorneys in domestic violence felony cases); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Credibility in the Courts: Why Is There a Gender Gap?, JUDGES’ J., Winter 1995, at 5,
5–6, 40–41 (explaining credibility biases against women); Deborah Tuerkheimer,
Incredible Women: Sexual Violence and the Credibility Discount, 166 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 11–13 (2017) (illustrating how rape allegations have been always intertwined with questions about victims’ credibility); see also Denise R. Johnson,
Prior False Allegations of Rape: Falsus in Uno, Falsus in Ominibus?, 7 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 243, 271–72 (1995) (discussing the effects of using prior victim’s alleged false allegations of wrongdoing); Kim Lane Scheppele, Just the
Facts, Ma’am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary Habits, and the Revision of the
Truth, 37 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV 123, 150–51 (1992) (explaining how SGBV victims
are not believed for their customary inconsistent behavior).
22
See Buller, supra note 4, at 9–13.
23
See id. at 9–15 (describing the historical context of the corroboration requirement and the rape-reform movement); see also Crooms, supra note 2, at
469–70, 477–78 (discussing how rape corroboration rules rested in assumptions
about credibility based on sex and race).
24
See Michelle J. Anderson, The Legacy of the Prompt Complaint Requirement, Corroboration Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions on Campus Sexual Assault, 84 B.U. L. REV. 945, 964–68 (2004) [hereinafter Anderson, Legacy];
Tuerkheimer, supra note 21, at 22–25.
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jury instructions. 25 It has also allowed the use of victims’ prior sexual history 26 and social companion defenses. 27 However, the impeachment of SGBV victims’ character for truthfulness is a subtler
and perhaps more pernicious patriarchal vestige as it shields itself
behind the neutral façade of character for untruthfulness evidence. 28
The mechanism by which our evidentiary system operates is
quite simple. 29 It allows not only the impeachment of witnesses’
credibility with their character for untruthfulness through reputation
or opinion testimony, 30 but also through evidence of prior specific

Anderson, Legacy, supra note 24, at 973–77.
See Michelle J. Anderson, Time to Reform Rape Shield Laws: Kobe Bryant
Case Highlights Holes in the Armor, CRIM. JUST., Summer 2014, at 14, 15 [hereinafter Anderson, Time to Reform Rape Shield Laws] (detailing how in the ‘70s
and early ‘80s jurisdictions in the United States adopted rape shield statutes to
prevent jurors from giving less credence to victims based on their sexual histories
and avoid jurors deciding cases based on stereotypes about complainants’ sexual
histories).
27
Tuerkheimer, supra note 21, at 26–27.
28
See Julia Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 152,
190–92, 200–01 (2017) [hereinafter Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy] (discussing how impeachment rules related to character for (un)truthfulness enforce a cultural conception of who is worthy of belief, not an actual view of truth, in the
context of race and gender).
29
The analysis in this Part is based on the FRE, which are followed in the
majority of jurisdictions in the United States. See id. at 186 (“Most states have
gradually adopted the Federal Rules’ approach to impeachment, and dual focus
on crimes and character evidence is nearly universal.”); Bennett Capers, Evidence
Without Rules, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 867, 872 (2018) [hereinafter Capers, Evidence Without Rules] (“In a very real sense, the Federal Rules of Evidence are
the Rules of Evidence.”). For a discussion on the distinctions of the relevant rules
between the FRE and other jurisdictions and the implications of such differences,
see infra Section IV.A.
30
For example, FRE 608, titled “A Witness’s Character for Truthfulness
or Untruthfulness,” in pertinent part, provides the following:
(a) REPUTATION OR OPINION EVIDENCE. A witness’s credibility
may be attacked or supported by testimony about the witness’s
reputation for having a character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or by testimony in the form of an opinion about that character. But evidence of truthful character is admissible only after
the witness’s character for truthfulness has been attacked.
FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
25
26
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acts. 31 As to specific acts, the FRE distinguish between criminal
acts 32 and other bad acts related to untruthfulness. 33 Although these

For example, FRE 608 and 609, respectively, allow the use of prior acts
and criminal convictions for the impeachment of a witness. See FED. R. EVID.
608(b), 609.
Rule 608 provides, in pertinent part:
Rule 608 provides, in pertinent part:
(b) SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF CONDUCT. Except for a criminal conviction under Rule 609, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to
prove specific instances of a witness’s conduct in order to prove
specific instances of a witness’s conduct in order to attack or
support the witness’s character for truthfulness. But the court
may, on cross-examination, allow them to be inquired into if
they are probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of:
(1) the witness; or
(2) another witness whose character the witness being crossexamined has testified about.
FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
As to prior criminal convictions, Rule 609, “Impeachment by Evidence of a Criminal Conviction,” states:
Rule 609 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) IN GENERAL. The following rules apply to attacking a witness’s character
for truthfulness by evidence of a criminal conviction:
(1) for a crime that, in the convicting jurisdiction, was punishable by
death or by imprisonment for more than one year, the evidence:
(A) must be admitted, subject to Rule 403, in a civil case or in a
criminal case in which the witness is not a defendant; and
(B) must be admitted in a criminal case in which the witness is a
defendant, if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect to that defendant; and
(2) for any crime regardless of the punishment, the evidence must be
admitted if the court can readily determine that establishing the elements of the crime required proving – or the witness’s admitting – a
dishonest act or false statement.
FED. R. EVID. 609.
32
See FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
33
See FED. R. EVID. 608(b).
31
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exceptions to the prohibition against character evidence 34 are predicated on truth seeking, 35 the notion that people who lie in one context would lie in others has been disproven. 36 Yet, because our system emphasizes the adversarial discovery of the truth through the
presentation of conflicting versions, the honesty of each witness is
crucial in deciding which of the conflicting accounts is the truth. 37
Thus, any evidence somewhat probative of how honest the witness
is could be admissible in spite of the risks of confusion or skewing
the perception of truth. 38
The importance of a witness’s credibility implicates how attorneys litigate, 39 which in turn affects the structure of the rules of impeachment based on character for untruthfulness. 40 As Professor
Méndez explains,

FRE 404 precludes the admission of character evidence; however, the
Rules provide for exceptions under Rules 607, 608, and 609. FED. R. EVID. 404.
35
See Robert D. Okun, Character and Credibility: A Proposal to Realign
Federal Rules of Evidence 608 and 609, 37 VILL. L. REV. 533, 565–68 (1992).
36
See id. at 546–49, 565–66; Edward J. Imwinkelried, Reshaping the “Grotesque” Doctrine of Character Evidence: The Reform Implications of the Most
Recent Psychological Research, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 741, 763–64 (2008); Jonathan
D. Kurland, Character as a Process in Judgment and Decision-Making and Its
Implications for the Character Evidence Prohibition in Anglo-American Law, 38
LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 135, 143–48 (2014); Miguel A. Méndez, California’s New
Law on Character Evidence: Evidence Code Section 352 and the Impact of Recent
Psychological Studies, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1003, 1051–53 (1984) [hereinafter
Méndez, California’s New Law on Character Evidence]; Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered: Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. REV. 949, 964–68 (2006); Anna Roberts, Conviction by
Prior Impeachment, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1977, 1996 (2016); Simon-Kerr, Credibility
by Proxy, supra note 28, at 208–09.
37
See, e.g., Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (1967) (“[W]e must
look to the legitimate purpose of impeachment which is, of course, not to show
that the accused who takes the stand is a ‘bad’ person but rather to show background facts which bear directly on whether jurors ought to believe him rather
than other and conflicting witnesses.”).
38
See Miguel A. Méndez, V. Witnesses: Conforming the California Evidence
Code to the Federal Rules of Evidence, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 455, 465–66 (2005)
[hereinafter Méndez, V. Witnesses]; Jenn Montan, Comment, N.J.R.E. 608 and
Specific Instances of Conduct: The Time Has Come for New Jersey to Join the
Majority, 49 SETON HALL L. REV. 441, 459–62 (2019).
39
See Méndez, V. Witnesses, supra note 38, at 465.
40
See infra Sections II.A–II.B.
34
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[t]rial lawyers know that the outcome of a trial will
be determined in almost all cases by the witnesses the
jurors choose to believe and the ones they decide to
ignore. Telling jurors which witnesses to believe or
disbelieve is thus a crucial part of a closing argument.
But such an appeal will not be persuasive unless the
lawyer can give the jurors reasons rooted in the evidence about why a witness should be believed or disbelieved. This inescapable dynamic of jury trials encourages lawyers to produce the most favorable evidence about the credibility of their witnesses and the
most unfavorable about their opponents. Rules of evidence generally counter this inclination by placing
strict limits on the use of evidence to support or attack the credibility of witnesses. Despite the unquestioned relevance of such evidence, the rules proceed
on the assumption that the unrestrained use of evidence on witness credibility may distract and confuse
jurors about the substantive issues to be decided. 41
For that reason, except for convictions for prior felonies 42 and
crimen falsi, 43 the impeachment based on character for untruthfulness is subject to the balancing of prejudice required by FRE 403. 44

Méndez, V. Witnesses, supra note 38, at 465 (emphasis added).
FED. R. EVID. 609. For example, FRE 609(a)(1)(B) provides for the admission of a prior felony conviction if the probative value outweighs the prejudicial
effect, a higher standard than FRE 403. FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1)(B). Further limits
are placed on prior felony convictions that are more than ten years old, have been
the subject of a pardon, or were the subject of juvenile adjudication. See FED. R.
EVID. 609(b)–(d).
43
FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2). A crimen falsi is an “offense that involves some
element of dishonesty or false statement.” Crimen falsi, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also Roberts, supra note 24, at 1983.
44
FRE 403, entitled “Excluding Relevant Evidence for Prejudice, Confusion,
Waste of Time or Other Reasons,” reads as follows:
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the
following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading
the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.
41
42
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Under FRE 403, the court has the discretion to exclude evidence of
character for untruthfulness or prevent questioning in such matters
if the evidence is ineffective towards aiding in the determination of
truth, is unfairly prejudicial, leads to confusion of the issues, or misleads the jury. 45 Likewise, FRE 611 limits the use of character for
untruthfulness evidence on cross-examination when use of that evidence constitutes harassment. 46
The final protection put in place when attorneys impeach a witness with evidence of character for untruthfulness comes when the
evidence used is in the form of specific acts. In that case, the use of
extrinsic evidence to support the previous act of untruthfulness is
precluded unless it is evidence of a conviction allowed under FRE
609. 47 In other words, in order to undermine the credibility of the
witness through specific acts, the attorney must do so without presenting any documentary evidence to support the inquiry. 48 As a result, the answers given by the witness are as far as an attorney can
go. 49 Purportedly, the reasons for excluding extrinsic evidence inFED. R. EVID. 403. See also Roberts, supra note 36, at 1983 (explaining how convictions under FRE 609(a)(1)(B) must be admitted irrespective of its probative
value or prejudicial effect).
45
FED. R. EVID. 403.
46
FRE 611, in pertinent part, establishes the following:
Rule 611. Mode and Order of Examining Witnesses and Presenting Evidence
(a) Control by the Court; Purposes. The court should exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence so as to:
(1) make those procedures effective for determining the truth;
(2) avoid wasting time; and
(3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.
FED. R. EVID. 611(a).
47
FED. R. EVID. 608 (precluding impeachment by introduction of extrinsic
evidence of specific acts, except where permitted under Rule 609); FED. R. EVID.
609 (permitting introduction of extrinsic evidence of certain prior convictions to
impeach for untruthfulness). There are other limits regarding prior convictions
(remoteness, pardon, annulment, rehabilitation, or juvenile adjudications). See
FED. R. EVID. 609(b)–(d).
48
See FED. R. EVID. 608, 609.
49
See FED. R. EVID. 608, 609. This does not mean that extrinsic evidence or
its shadow does not find its way into the jurors’ attention. Capers, Evidence Without Rules, supra note 29, at 871, 895. As Professor Bennett Capers points out,
there is functional evidence that escapes the gatekeeping directives of the FRE.
Id. at 871 (2018) (explaining the term functional evidence as evidence that is not
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clude avoiding distracting the jury from the matter being adjudicated, limiting undue delay, preventing confusion of the issues, and
precluding the unfair treatment of witnesses. 50 Yet, in SGBV cases,
as this Article will explain, the use of prior acts of untruthfulness
exacerbates jury confusion, treats victim witnesses unfairly, and distracts adjudicators from the matter to be judged. 51
Previous acts of untruthfulness are the most powerful type of
character evidence in an attorney’s repertoire. 52 This is remarkably
true in cases of SGBV, which are often described as “he said/she
said” contests, 53 where perceptions of credibility are already skewed
against the victims. 54 In SGBV cases, like Jennifer’s case, 55 attorneys impeach the victim’s credibility with specific acts of untruth-

regulated by the FRE but is used by jurors in their fact-finding role). In Jennifer’s
case, for example, the shadow of the extrinsic evidence of the loan application
comes into evidence by the simple flickering of documents by defense counsel
when inquiring into whether Jennifer recalls the details of her false statement.
50
Montan, supra note 38, at 459–62; see Okun, supra note 35, at 544; see
also Kassandra Altantulkhuur, Note, A Second Rape: Testing Victim Credibility
Through Prior False Accusations, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1091, 1095 (2018).
51
See infra Section II.B.2.; Montan, supra note 38, at 459–62.
52
Michael D. Schwartz & Phillip R. Maltin, Strength of Character: The Admissibility of Character Evidence in Civil Trials is Subject to Exacting Standards,
L.A. LAW., June 2010, at 26, 26–28 (2010).
53
Hartley, supra note 21, at 514. Most of these cases happen in private with
no witnesses but the people implicated, giving the sense to others that it is a swearing contest between the victim and the alleged perpetrator. Id. at 527, 535–36.
54
See TASLITZ, supra note 21, at 6 (pointing out how “[d]espite several decades of a renewed women’s movement and increasing attention to the problem
of rape, judges and juries continue to be skeptical of rape, demanding greater
proof than for many other types of crimes and demonstrating deep suspicion of
victims.”); Hartley, supra note 21, at 514. In reality, “[f]ormulations such as ‘nobody really knows what happened’ in the cases of sexual assault and rape, for
example, work to discredit victims before they speak.” LEIGH GILMORE, TAINTED
WITNESS: WHY WE DOUBT WHAT WOMEN SAY ABOUT THEIR LIVES 140 (2017);
see also Sherry F. Colb, The Difference Between Presuming Innocence and Presuming Victim Perjury in Acquaintance Rape Trials, DORF ON LAW (July 16,
2018),
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2018/07/the-difference-between-presuming.html [hereinafter Colb, The Difference Between] (explaining how “[c]enturies
of misogyny have . . . presume[ed] that a woman who claims to have been raped
is an insane perjurer”).
55
See supra Part I.
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fulness in order to further a sexist narrative that women are not credible and SGBV victims’ accounts are implausible. 56 These attorneys
take advantage of the cultural discounting of victims and the oftenmisunderstood or unknown processes through which victims relate
their accounts of abuse. 57 By discrediting victims, defense lawyers
benefit from adjudicators’ integrative processing. 58 When jurors are
unable to reconcile a victim’s actual behavior with imaginary or cultural narratives about SGBV crimes 59 and how a victim “should” act
or look, 60 jurors may be more likely to conclude that the SGBV accounts are false. 61
As it was shown in Jennifer’s account, 62 this sexist defense strategy resonates well with adjudicators by hindering convictions and
deterring victims from coming forward. 63 For this reason, defense
attorneys impeach the credibility of SGBV victims with evidence of
character for untruthfulness. 64 Plaintiff’s attorneys in high profile

See TASLITZ, supra note 21, at 6; Hartley, supra note 21, at 514.
See Altantulkhuur, supra note 50, at 1111 (explaining the process of recanting and how it does not mean that the victim is lying); Scheppele, supra note
21, at 138–40 (explaining customary behavior from SGBV victims such as delay
in reporting, revised stories, and taking the blame).
58
Integrative processing refers to the phenomenon that “people make connections between various pieces of information and base decisions on overall impressions rather than on specific pieces of information.” Christina A. Studebaker
& Steven D. Penrod, Pretrial Publicity and Its Influence on Juror Decision Making, in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: AN EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVE 254, 257 (Neil
Brewer & Kipling D. Williams eds., 2005); see also Saul M. Kassin & Samuel R.
Sommers, Inadmissible Testimony, Instructions to Disregard, and the Jury: Substantive Versus Procedural Considerations, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 1046, 1050 (1997) (showing that jurors adjust the exclusion of evidence to
their preexisting beliefs lessening the effects of a limiting instruction).
59
See, e.g., TASLITZ, supra note 21, at 19–21.
60
Rose Corrigan & Corey S. Shdaimah, People with Secrets: Contesting,
Constructing, and Resisting Women’s Claims About Sexualized Victimization, 65
CATH. U. L. REV. 429, 436–46 (2016) (discussing Nils Christie’s theory of the
ideal victim as applied to SGBV victims).
61
See Jane H. Aiken & Jane C. Murphy, Evidence Issues in Domestic Violence Civil Cases, 34 FAM. L.Q. 43, 44 (2000).
62
See supra Part I.
63
See infra Part III. For an analysis on how and why these strategies work,
see TASLITZ, supra note 21, at 44–57 (discussing the rape cases of Mike Tyson
and Glen Ridge).
64
See Méndez, V. Witness, supra note 38, at 465.
56
57
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accusations, such as Britney Taylor’s, 65 are also aware of this strategy, and try to counteract it by preemptively rehabilitating their client’s credibility. 66
Although research in this area is scarce, 67 analyses exist of wellpublicized SGBV cases in and outside the courtroom, including Professor Anita Hill’s, 68 Nafisatou Diallo’s, 69 Katelyn Faber’s, 70 and
Doctor Christine Blasey Ford’s. 71 There are also news reports on
less-publicized trials, such as Liza Yajaira’s, 72 and court opinions
that recount the defense strategies used by attorneys in these types
of cases. 73 Additionally, some scholars have conducted targeted

65
In September 2019, Britney Taylor accused NFL player Antonio Brown of
sexually assaulting her. Patrik Walker et al., Antonio Brown Cut by Patriots:
Timeline of How He Wore Out His Welcome in Pittsburgh, Oakland, New England and What’s Next, CBS SPORTS, https://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/antonio-brown-cut-by-patriots-timeline-of-how-he-wore-out-his-welcome-in-pittsburgh-oakland-new-england-and-whats-next/ (last updated Sept. 19, 2019). Not
long after Taylor went public with her allegations, another accuser, who remains
anonymous came forward accusing Antonio Brown of sexually assaulting her.
Mike Reiss, Brown Out: Pats Cut WR Amid Off-Field Allegations, ESPN (Sept.
19, 2019, 4:15 PM), https://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/27662788/brown-patscut-wr-amid-field-allegations.
66
Antonio Brown Rape Accuser Claims She Passed Lie Detector, TMZ
SPORTS (Sept. 11, 2019 6:20 AM), https://www.tmz.com/2019/09/11/antoniobrown-rape-accuser-claims-she-passed-lie-detector/.
67
See Hartley, supra note 21, at 510–11.
68
See Scheppele, supra note 21, at 128–45; GILMORE, supra note 54, at 27–
58.
69
See GILMORE, supra note 54, at 135–45.
70
See JOHN F. WUKOVITS, KOBE BRYANT 58–62 (2011); Renae Franiuk et
al., Prevalence of Rape Myths in Headlines and Their Effects on Attitudes Toward
Rape, 58 SEX ROLES 790, 790–800 (2008); Anderson, Time to Reform Rape Shield
Laws, supra note 26, at 14–19.
71
See Kate Shaw, How Strong Does the Evidence Against Kavanaugh Need
to Be?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/20/opinion/kavanaugh-blasey-allegation-disqualify.html; Mimi Rocah et al., Brett Kavanaugh Allegations: Why They Are Not Simply A ‘He Said, She Said’ Situation,
NBC NEWS (Sept. 18, 2018, 3:41 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/allegations-against-brett-kavanaugh-are-not-simply-he-said-shencna910771.
72
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
73
See, e.g., Halstead v. Texas, 891 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)
(cross-examination of victim raised issue of whether she had a history of making
false accusations of sexual misconduct against men she did not like); New Jersey
v. Frost, 577 A.2d 1282, 1288 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (victim’s conduct
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studies of the defenses used by attorneys in certain types of SGBV
cases. 74
While sources suggest that defense themes in SGBV cases are
not necessarily different from other cases, 75 they show an interesting
way in which defenses are assembled and how often they are employed. 76 For instance, one study found that in domestic violence
cases, the most common defenses are self-defense or provocation, a
lesser charge, diminished capacity, and innocence. 77 The defense of
innocence was reported to be used 37.5% of the time, while selfdefense, diminished capacity, or a lesser charge were used 15%,
25%, and 22.5%, respectively. 78
Remarkably, attorneys apparently feel quite confident about
their chances of prevailing by denying their clients committed the
actions charged, despite the State’s evidence to the contrary. 79 In
contrast, defenses that would admit some lesser type of wrongdoing
and which do not require negating all of the allegations are less frequently used. 80 One possible explanation is that denying all allegations is somewhat easier in SGBV cases because these cases are ultimately credibility contests. 81
If two people are equally believable, completely contradicting
one party’s account of the facts, arguably, does not seem to be the
best strategy because it automatically implies that someone is lying.
However, that does not seem to worry defense attorneys in SGBV
of staying with her abuser makes it appear that she is lying about the attack); Wisconsin v. Jensen, 432 N.W.2d 913, 915 (Wis. 1988) (defense cross-examined several witnesses to establish that the victim’s delay in reporting the assault and denying the incident to family members supports the theory of fabrication); Washington v. Ciskie, 751 P.2d 1165, 1173 (Wash. 1988) (defense implied to jury that
behavior of battered woman indicated that she lied about attack).
74
See, e.g., Hartley, supra note 21, at 537.
75
See id. at 513.
76
See id. at 522–34.
77
Id. at 518. Having an alibi does not seem to be a defense used in these types
of cases even though it would negate the charges. Cf. id. However, because the
aggression in these types of cases happen in private spaces between people with
close relationships, presumptively, the easiest defense to negate the charges is to
argue that the victim is lying. See id. at 535–36.
78
Id. This does not seem to be different from defenses in rape cases. See, e.g.,
TASLITZ, supra note 21, at 47, 55.
79
See Hartley, supra note 21, at 518.
80
See id.
81
Id. at 534.
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cases. 82 Perhaps the reason why attorneys prefer the innocence path
is that they know that SGBV victims’ testimony could be easily discounted. 83 Defense attorneys can easily impeach the victims’ versions of the events because triers of fact tend to believe victims less
than defendants. 84 In other words, they know that the victim’s perceived lack of credibility provides their best defense.
Recently, we witnessed a great display of this strategy in the
nomination hearings of Justice Brett Kavanaugh. 85 The White
House gave a spin to negating Dr. Blasey Ford’s accusations by stating that they had no doubt that something terrible happened to her
but that she was confused about who her aggressor was. 86 In other
words, she remembered the assault but not who the aggressor was
and therefore she was lying about Kavanaugh sexually assaulting
her.
In fact, Hartley’s study shows that some of the strategies or impeachment techniques used to mount these defenses depend on the
theory that the victim is lying. 87 Depending on the defense, the most
frequent strategies used include no witnesses, general victim’s character assassination, highlighting that the accused never threatened
the victim, and turning victim’s behavior against her. 88 Another theory frequently employed is that the relationship was fine and the accused was remorseful after the offense. 89 These defense narratives
are used to establish the victim’s propensity to lie, a lack of evidence
of defendant’s prior abusive behavior, or a lack of corroborative testimony. 90 Professor Andrew Taslitz made a similar observation
when he highlighted that, in cases of rape, the cultural story of the
See id. at 518.
See id. at 530–34.
84
See Aiken & Murphy, supra note 61, at 44.
85
See Kellyanne Conway: Christine Blasey Ford “Absolutely Was Wronged
NEWS
(Sept.
28,
2018),
by
Somebody,”
CBS
https://www.cbsnews.com/video/kellyanne-conway-christine-blasey-ford-absolutely-was-wronged-by-somebody/ (Kellyanne Conway discussing Dr. Christine
Blasey Ford’s testimony at 4:10–5:30).
86
Id.
87
See Hartley, supra note 21, at 534 (“These tactics range from outright
denying the abuse (it didn’t happen, she’s lying) to minimizing the abuse (I never
punched her, I just slapped her) . . . .”).
88
Id. at 533.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 534–37.
82
83
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lying woman helps to craft a portrait “of the vengeful, spurned
woman, lying on the stand to reap her retribution.” 91 When these
defensive narratives are combined with the reality that the offenses
often take place without witnesses, 92 the prevalence of revised accounts, 93 and the phenomenon of testimonial injustice, 94 defense attorneys have a reliable foundation from which to argue that the offense never occurred.
Testimonial injustice ensues when “the prejudice results in the
speaker’s receiving more credibility than she otherwise would
have—a credibility excess—or it results in her receiving less credibility than she otherwise would have—a credibility deficit.” 95 In the
context of SGBV victims, the credibility deficit is caused by the narrative of women as tainted witnesses 96 and the narrative of implausibility associated with the “he said/she said” credibility bias. 97 As
Professor Tuerkheimer observes, credibility has two components:
(1) the trustworthiness of the witness; and (2) the plausibility of the
testimony. 98 In the case of SGBV victims both components are af-

See TASLITZ, supra note 21, at 18.
See Hartley, supra note 21, at 535–36.
93
See Scheppele, supra note 21, at 138–40. The term revised accounts refers
to stories that are altered over time, often because victims repress what happened
to them, hope the abuse will go away, and cover up for their abusers. Id. Revised
accounts can also be attributed to the physical and psychological harms caused by
the abuse. Deborah Epstein & Lisa A. Goodman, Discounting Credibility: Doubting the Testimony and Dismissing the Experiences of Domestic Violence Survivors and Other Women, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 449–51 (2019).
94
MIRANDA FRICKER, EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE: POWER AND THE ETHICS OF
KNOWING 17 (2007).
95
Id.
96
See id. at 21.
97
See Hartley, supra note 21, at 514. As a corollary to this credibility deficit,
SGBV defendants experience a net credibility excess—they benefit from a surplus
caused by the victims’ credibility deficit. See Schafran, supra note 21, at 42 (“As
a group [women] are perceived as less competent than men; the context of the
harms we seek redress in courts is often completely foreign to the trier of fact; and
even when the harm is acknowledged, it is often minimized by a de minimis punishment for those who injure us.”).
98
Tuerkheimer, supra note 21, at 13 (citing Karen Jones, The Politics of
Credibility, in A MIND OF ONE’S OWN: FEMINIST ESSAYS ON REASON AND
OBJECTIVITY 154, 155 (Louise M. Antony & Charlotte E. Witt eds., 2d ed. 2002)
(adopting Lockean terminology of credibility)).
91
92
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fected. Firstly, women are perceived as less trustworthy, and therefore less credible than men. 99 Secondly, SGBV accounts are perceived as implausible because of biases against victims and frequent
misunderstandings of victims’ conduct. 100
A. Women’s Lack of Trustworthiness
The ways in which women are frequently turned into tainted or
less credible witnesses have been well documented. 101 Schafran, for
instance, suggested in her analysis of intimate partner violence that
this perception is triggered by three credibility biases: (1) collective
credibility; (2) consequential credibility; and (3) contextual credibility. 102 The first two biases are related to the first component of credibility—the trustworthiness of the witness. 103
1.
COLLECTIVE CREDIBILITY BIAS
The lack of collective credibility points to a history in which our
culture has deemed women less credible as a group. 104 Simply being
female brands a victim as untruthful or untrustworthy. 105 This is true
not only for victims, but for women involved in the judicial process
in any capacity. 106 Jurors (1) find female witnesses to be slightly less

99
100
101

at 795.

See GILMORE, supra note 54, at 18.
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., GILMORE, supra note 54, at 138–39; Franiuk et al., supra note 70,

Schafran, supra note 21, at 5. Other authors have pointed to these phenomena, albeit having labeled the three differently. See, e.g., GILMORE, supra note 54,
at 18. For example, Gilmore wrote that “[w]omen are often seen as unpersuasive
witnesses for three related reasons: because they are women, because through testimony they seek to bear witness to inconvenient truths, and because they possess
less symbolic and material capital than men as witnesses in courts of law.” Id.
103
See GILMORE, supra note 54, at 18.
104
Id.; see Schafran, supra note 21, at 5 (“Yet for women, achieving credibility in and out of the courtroom is no easy task.”).
105
Schafran, supra note 21, at 5 (“[S]ocial science and legal research reveal
that women are still perceived as less credible than men.”).
106
See, e.g., Nicole D. Galli & Marta L. Villarraga, Does Your Expert’s Gender Matter? Explicit and Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, A.B.A. (Aug. 17, 2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/woman-advocate/articles/2017/does-your-experts-gender-matter-explicit-implicit-bias-in-courtroom/.
102
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credible and persuasive than men; 107 (2) are less likely to credit witnesses who use voice patterns regularly associated with women; 108
and (3) perceive female attorneys as “shrill, irrational, and unpleasant” for expressing the same emotions that, when expressed by male
attorneys, are interpreted as appropriate. 109
This lack of credibility is based solely on the identity of women
as women. 110 However, its roots are shared with the credibility discounts other groups experience. 111 As Miranda Fricker has pointed
out, “[m]any of the stereotypes of historically powerless groups such
as women, black people, or working-class people variously involve
an association with some attribute inversely related to competence
or sincerity or both.” 112
However, credibility is not only discounted in cases in which
parties are of the opposite sex. 113 This phenomenon is a function of
how witnesses are gendered. 114
For example, in a study about lesbian intimate partner violence,
researchers found that when participants read a defendant and a victim as masculine, they viewed the victim as more credible than victims read as feminine. 115 Similarly, when participants believed that
a defendant and a victim both had traditionally-masculine traits, the
participants also assessed higher levels of defendant’s responsibility. 116 Conversely, “when the victim was [perceived as] feminine,
the defendant’s appearance did not impact ratings of defendant responsibility.” 117 Also, participants had more sympathy for victims
Id.
See Ken Broda-Bahm, Avoid Rising Intonation?, PERSUASIVE LITIGATOR
(May 26, 2014), https://www.persuasivelitigator.com/2014/05/avoid-rising-intonation.html (summarizing studies finding that rising intonation or upspeak negatively impact perceptions of credibility).
109
Lara Bazelon, What It Takes to be a Trial Lawyer if You’re Not a Man,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/09
/female-lawyers-sexism-courtroom/565778/.
110
Schafran, supra note 21, at 5.
111
See Tuerkheimer, supra note 21, at 42–44.
112
FRICKER, supra note 94, at 32.
113
See, e.g., Wasarhaley et al., supra note 2, at 651–53.
114
See id. This bias, like any of the biases that are discussed throughout, is not
held only by men. See id. at 647–48.
115
Id. at 648.
116
Id.
117
Id.
107
108
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seen as masculine. 118 In sum, the study found that exhibiting masculine traits leads to higher believability and in turn a higher likelihood of attributing guilt to a charged abuser. 119 These results came
as a surprise to the researchers that expected more pro-victim ratings
when the defendant exhibited masculine traits. 120 However, when
we account for the lack of collective credibility of women or victims
with feminine traits, the results are expected and coherent.
Overcoming this type of trustworthiness-bias based on a witness’s gender is very difficult. “Negative identity prejudice, as
Fricker calls it, is especially concerning because it tends to be ‘resistant to counter-evidence.”‘ 121 In addition, as Professor Capers has
observed, this bias is a type of evidence that is put before the jury
without any check, as it is part of the functional evidence that the
FRE do not regulate. 122 However, we cannot pinpoint the particular
conduct from an attorney or witness that would make such evidence
apparent. 123
Id.
Id. at 648, 651.
120
Id. at 647–48.
121
Tuerkheimer, supra note 21, at 43 (quoting FRICKER, supra note 94, at 35).
122
Capers, Evidence Without Rules, supra note 29, at 871, 895.
123
Perhaps the best way to counter this bias is through implicit bias training.
However, the effectiveness of implicit bias training has been questioned. See
MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLIND SPOT: HIDDEN
BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE 152 (2013); Frank Kineavy, Implicit Bias Training for
Police Gaining Attention, DIVERSITYINC (Oct. 10, 2016), http://www.diversityinc.com/news/implicit-bias-training-police-gaining-attention (stating that “it
is undetermined whether implicit bias training is effective”); Destiny Peery, Opinion, Implicit Bias Training for Police May Help, but It’s Not Enough,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 14, 2016, 9:29 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/destiny-peery/implicit-bias-training-fo_b_9464564.html
(stating
that there is little evidence that implicit bias trainings alone will have a positive
effect on racial bias in policing and may, in fact, lead to negative backlash). See
Jason A. Cantone, Federal and State Court Cooperation: Effectiveness of Implicit
Bias Trainings, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/content/337738/effectiveness-implicit-bias-trainings (last visited Oct. 3, 2019) (explaining discussions
held with judges in an effort to combat implicit bias). If implicit bias training is a
solution, it would be more easily implemented for judges and attorneys who the
state can require to be continuously trained well in advanced of a trial. See Anita
Chabria, California May Soon Push Doctors and Lawyers to Confront Their Biases, L.A. TIMES (September 12, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-09-12/california-implicit-bias-legislation-doctors-lawyers. Training jurors would unduly extend the trial or be ineffective as it would be done
118
119
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Victims are well aware that this bias exists. 124 For example, in
Time’s article titled Time 2017 Person of the Year: The Silence
Breakers, one of the victims interviewed stated that “[she] stayed
anonymous because [she] live[s] in a very small community. And
they just think usually that [the women are] lying and complainers.” 125 As seen in Jennifer’s case, victims are deterred from coming
forward even under the guise of anonymity. 126 Furthermore, as discussed infra Part III, pervasive biases hinder convictions and favorable adjudications for victims in SGBV cases.
2. CONSEQUENTIAL CREDIBILITY BIAS
Consequential credibility bias, another bias Schafran proposes
that is rooted in women’s identities, also affects convictions and favorable adjudications. 127 Schafran argues that women are afforded
less consequential credibility, meaning they are part of a group
whose injuries and harms are not taken seriously. 128 Thus, their
claims are trivialized and minimized. 129
One way in which the consequential credibility bias manifests is
in the reluctance to arrest or prosecute abusers. 130 Jurors and judges
treat SGBV cases with the same disdain as police officers and prosecutors, 131 suggesting that they think SGBV injuries, cases, and
shortly before the trial. However, for jurors, implicit bias can be address through
jury instructions. See e.g., Capers, Evidence Without Rules, supra note 29, at 898–
900.
124
See, e.g., Zacharek et al., supra note 6.
125
Id.
126
See supra Part I.
127
Schafran, supra note 21, at 40–41.
128
Id.; see also Tuerkheimer, supra note 21, at 28 (“Although false reports of
rape are uncommon, law enforcement officers often default to incredulity when
women allege sexual assault, resulting in curtailed investigations and infrequent
arrests.”).
129
See Schafran, supra note 21, at 40–41.
130
Hartley, supra note 21, at 512. Part of the reason why police officers do
not arrest for this type of offense is their skepticism regarding the occurrence of
SGBV, as they tend to overestimate the incidence of false reporting. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 21, at 16.
131
See Schafran, supra note 21, at 9, 40; Gender Fairness Implementation
Comm., Gender Fairness in North Dakota’s Courts: A Ten-Year Assessment, 83
N.D. L. REV. 309, 337–40 (2007); Jacqueline St. Joan, Sex, Sense, and Sensibility:
Trespassing into the Culture of Domestic Abuse, 20 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 263,
265–66 (1997); Aiken & Murphy, supra note 61, 45–46.
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abuses are inconsequential. A recent example of this bias was seen
in the defense of Justice Brett Kavanaugh by two women featured
during a CNN panel of Republican women from Florida. 132 For instance, Gina Sosa stated, “What boy hasn’t done this in high
school?” 133 Similarly, Irina Villarino argued that there was no harm
because there was no intercourse. 134 In short, by exposing their consequential credibility bias, both women underplayed and trivialized
the harms suffered by victims in situations similar to Dr. Blasey
Ford. 135
As with the lack of collective credibility, consequential credibility bias is hard to combat because it is rooted in the identity of the
victims. 136 Like collective credibility bias, SGBV victims are aware
that consequential credibility bias exists. 137 As in Jennifer’s case,
victims frequently opt not to go to the police or even talk to friends
and family about the SGBV they suffer. 138 For instance, nearly
twenty percent of non-student female victims of rape or sexual assault of college age, decided not to report because “police would not
or could not do anything to help.” 139
The preferred strategy to counteract this problem has been training all actors in the judicial system about the prevalence and importance of prosecuting SGBV cases and about implicit bias. 140
However, the effectiveness of educating members of the judiciary
See CNN, GOP Voter on Kavanaugh: What Boy Hasn’t Done This in High
School? YOUTUBE (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
flIM3AUyQ3A.
133
Id. at 1:11–1:14. All the women dismissed her claims as either misremembering, based in jealousy, or overblown. Id. at 2:29–2:42. They also questioned
her silence and recanting of the story, in addition to victim-blaming Dr. Blasey
Ford. Id. at 1:26–1:44, 2:29–2:42. All of their comments show how consequential,
contextual, and collective credibility operate at the same time in SGBV cases.
134
Id. at 0:49–1:01.
135
See id. at 0:49–1:16.
136
See Schafran, supra note 21, at 41.
137
See, e.g., SOFI SINOZICH & LYNN LANGTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT VICTIMIZATION
AMONG COLLEGE-AGE FEMALES, 1995-2013, at 1, 9 (2014), https://www.
bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsavcaf9513.pdf.
138
See id.; Hartley, supra note 21, at 536.
139
SINOZICH & LANGTON, supra note 137, at 9.
140
See Deborah Epstein, Effective Intervention in Domestic Violence Cases:
Rethinking the Roles of Prosecutors, Judges, and the Court System, 11 YALE J.L.
& FEMINISM 3, 44 (1999).
132
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about the prevalence of SGBV has not really been measured. 141
Moreover, its effectiveness might be diminished when triers of fact
are faced with impeachments that reinforce collective and contextual biases against a backdrop of a lack of physical evidence. 142
B. Perceived Implausibility of SGBV Victims’ Testimony
As anticipated, not only are SGBV victims disbelieved because
their trustworthiness is discounted, 143 but their trustworthiness is
discounted based on a perceived implausibility. 144 This perceived
implausibility stems from a failure of understanding victims’ reality. 145 Like the lack of collective and consequential credibility, this
failure of understanding is the result of centuries of diminished social power as women have not been able to participate in the construction of the social experience. 146 As a result, women’s experiences not shared by the hegemonic group of men “find no meaningful outlet in collective notions of reality.” 147 This translates into two

See Jane K. Stoever, Stories Absent from the Courtroom: Responding to
Domestic Violence in the Context of HIV and AIDS, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1157, 1216
n.220 (2009) (“There is consensus among advocates that training is the most effective for judges who are receptive to learning about domestic violence; however, the true effectiveness of judicial training programs has not been measured.”).
142
See BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 123, at 152. Some researchers,
however, have pointed out that training jurors about implicit bias at the beginning
of the trial or jury instructions regarding implicit bias could be effective at preventing jurors from engaging in this type of thinking when adjudicating cases. See
David Alan Sklansky, Evidentiary Instructions and the Jury as Other, 65 STAN.
L. REV. 407, 439, 452–53 (2013); Elizabeth Ingriselli, Note, Mitigating Jurors’
Racial Biases: The Effects of Content and Timing of Jury Instructions, 124 YALE
L.J. 1690, 1729–30 (2015). This may be true as the time between the training and
the instruction is not so far removed from the decision. However, the literature
also seems to indicate that over time bias training loses its effectiveness. See supra
note 123 and accompanying text.
143
See Schafran, supra note 21, at 5.
144
See Tuerkheimer, supra note 21, at 46 (citing FRICKER, supra note 94, at
1) (explaining how hermeneutical injustice overlaps with testimonial injustice).
145
Id. at 46–48.
146
Id. at 46 (citing FRICKER, supra note 94, at 148).
147
Id. at 47–48.
141
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phenomena regarding SGBV: (1) society misunderstands the processes of SGBV because of an inability to empathize, 148 and (2) the
collective framing of the SGBV and its harms are structurally prejudiced with biased labels and stereotypes. 149
1. CONTEXTUAL CREDIBILITY BIAS
Schafran denominates the first phenomenon as contextual credibility bias. 150 This bias refers to the inability to put oneself in the
victim’s shoes. 151 In other words, triers of fact are unable to understand victims’ experiences because of stereotypes, social narratives
or scripts, misconceptions about how victims process their trauma,
and underestimation of the effects of abuse on victims. 152
Some of the representative narratives of this bias identified in
the literature, and present in Jennifer’s case, 153 include the idea that
the victim is lying when recanting or revising her story; nothing happened, because if it had the victim would have come forward sooner;
the abuser is not the type of person who would commit such an act;
and questioning why would the victim put herself in the situation of
violence. 154 President Trump embodied a perfect example of this
type of credibility bias in a tweet about Dr. Blasey Ford not coming
forward when the alleged attack first happened:
I have no doubt that, if the attack on Dr. Ford was as
bad as she says, charges would have been immediately filed with local Law Enforcement Authorities
[sic] by either her or her loving parents. I ask that she

See, e.g., St. Joan, supra note 131, at 290–92 (discussing how cultivating
a sense of empathy with judges for victims will help to lessen cultural myths about
SGBV victims).
149
See Tuerkheimer, supra note 21, at 47 (citing FRICKER, supra note 94, at
155) (explaining the hermeneutical marginalization of women’s experiences).
150
Schafran, supra note 21, at 6.
151
See id.
152
See id. at 6; see also Hartley, supra note 21, at 512, 539; Mary Dodge &
Edith Greene, Juror and Expert Conceptions of Battered Women, 6 VIOLENCE &
VICTIMS 271, 281 (1991). This helps to explain why it has been reported that expert testimony in SGBV cases is very effective in rehabilitating the victims and
securing pro-victim judgments. Scheppele, supra note 21, at 157–60.
153
See supra Part I.
154
See Franiuk et al., supra note 70, at 790–91.
148
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bring those filings forward so that we can learn date,
time, and place! 155
Scholars argue that these narratives are in place to protect us
from uncomfortable truths and to let us think that we might have
control over these events and might even be able to prevent them. 156
In other words, we believe these narratives because it allows us to
assume that such an aggression will not happen to us. However, the
endorsement of these narratives has the effect of diminishing sympathy towards victims. 157
This self-preservation strategy causes us to disparage and question the victim more if her case does not fit into some of the stereotypical narratives. 158 For instance, one of the most prevalent stereotypical scripts in cases of rape or sexual violence is that the perpetrator is a stranger. 159 If the victim was abused by someone close to
her, one tends to question more whether she is actually telling the
truth. 160
Another negative effect of this aspect of contextual credibility is
that stereotypes and narratives are reinforced by popular culture. 161
For example, in studies performed about the Kobe Bryant rape case,
researchers found that
65% of newspapers articles perpetuated at least one
myth about sexual assault, with “she’s lying” being
the myth most commonly perpetuated. Further, participants in this study who were exposed to a rape
myth-supporting article were less likely to think Bryant was guilty (before the case went to trial) and more

Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 21, 2018, 6:14
AM), https://twitter.com/
realdonaldtrump/status/1043126336473055235?lang=es.
156
Franiuk et al., supra note 70, at 791.
157
Id.
158
Id.; see also Natalie Nanasi, Domestic Violence Asylum and the Perpetuation of the Victimization Narrative, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 754 (2017) (discussing
how asylum seekers are often disbelieved for not comporting to stereotypical victim behavior).
159
Franiuk et al., supra note 70, at 791.
160
See id.
161
Id. at 792.
155
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likely to think the victim was lying than those exposed to a rape myth-attenuating article. 162
This type of reinforcement is also present in television and cinema. 163
The danger of these myths in the media is that they mislead and
encourage people to distrust the victim, even when examining the
evidence might counter misconceptions. 164 In addition, these myths
provide a fertile substratum for future triers of fact and attorneys to
explain the SGBV with which they come across in court. 165 For instance, Pennington and Hastie found that jurors will consider external information as part of their thought processes to determine the
guilt or innocence of a defendant. 166 Basically, triers of fact will “fill
in the blanks” in the cases with their preconceived notions or previous knowledge about the dynamics of SGBV. 167 Thus, these studies
explain why the impeachment of victims’ credibility is so commonplace and successful.
Attorneys, as part of society, are susceptible to believing these
stereotypes about victims in SGBV cases. 168 That is why attorneys
use them as a bridge to communicate with triers of fact. Driven by
these stereotypes, attorneys and triers of fact instinctively question
victims and find material to support their distrust. 169
As Hartley points out,
162
Id. Another study looking exclusively at headlines from the same case
found that myths were present in almost ten percent. Id. at 797.
163
See id. at 792; see also TASLITZ, supra note 21, at 19–25 (discussing the
embodiment of rape narratives in The Little Mermaid, Where the Boys Are, and
Thelma and Louise).
164
Franiuk et al., supra note 70, at 792.
165
See Hartley, supra note 21, at 539 (citing Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie,
Juror Decision-Making Models: The Generalization Gap, 89 PSYCHOL.
BULLETIN 246, 248–49 (1981)).
166
Pennington & Hastie, supra note 165, at 246, 248–49.
167
Hartley, supra note 21, at 539; see Scheppele, supra note 21, at 137–38
(analyzing the filling of silences and revised stories in Professor Anita Hill’s
case); TASLITZ, supra note 21, at 7–8 (explaining how jurors think in terms of
stories and how they fill the gaps in the stories).
168
See Tuerkheimer, supra note 21, at 38 (discussing how prosecutors consider their own skepticisms and credibility discounting when deciding whether to
pursue sexual assault cases).
169
See, e.g., Hartley, supra note 21, at 539.
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if jurors accept the commonly held myths about domestic violence [or any other type of SGBV] and the
defense further reinforces these misconceptions at
trial, they may “fill in the blanks” with an unrealistic
view of the violent relationship, and their evaluation
of the evidence may be based on misconceptions and
prejudices unsupported by scientific research. 170
For example, in Jennifer’s case, 171 jurors will fill in the blanks
as to why she did not speak of the rape before, why Mark was able
to come into her house even when they were separated, why she took
a pregnancy test, or why she said to the police that she has not been
a victim of domestic violence. 172 They would likely assume that she
was heartbroken and lying, trying to get back at Mark for leaving by
having sex with other men clandestinely. The defense attorney just
needs to ask the questions that will open the door to stereotypes that
undermine the victim’s credibility. 173
Consequently, the balance in these credibility contests is resolved in favor of the defendants, especially when defense counsel
highlights a lack of corroborative testimony or evidence. 174 Recall
the common impeachment strategies used to undermine the victim’s
credibility, 175 such as pointing out that there are no witnesses besides the parties and eliciting that the defendant never threatened the
victim. 176 As Scheppele has pointed out,
[c]ases of sexualized violence [or SGBV] often
evolve into a “he said, she said” battle of competing
narratives in which the “he,” who is the defendant,
wins by default simply because the evidence is contested. Default rules about the burden of proof and
the benefit of the doubt resolve all divergent accounts

Id.
See supra Part I.
172
See Hartley, supra note 21, at 539 (explaining how jurors fill in the blanks
with own life experiences).
173
See Méndez, V. Witnesses, supra note 38, at 465.
174
See, e.g., Crooms, supra note 2, at 471.
175
See Hartley, supra note 21, at 522–34.
176
Id. at 535–36.
170
171
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in favor of the accused when there are merely contested stories with no “hard” evidence to compel
choice between them. Though laws on the books
look more woman-friendly on issues of sexualized
violence than they used to, women do not always find
that helpful laws produce victories for women. 177
Moreover, common stereotypes connected to victims are reinforced by the lack of understanding triers of fact hold about the dynamics of SGBV. 178 Specifically, one of the most damaging of those
stereotypes is that victims who change their stories are liars. 179 However, the most misunderstood characteristic of domestic violence
victims is that such victims have a tendency to tell revised stories of
their abuse. 180 It has been reported that women tend to move from
less stereotyped, general, emotionless accounts of their abuse to
more detailed, compelling, and specific narratives. 181 In fact, one
sign of recovery is that women’s stories of abuse change in this way
as they recover their sense of safety and make coherent their memories of abuse. 182 However, this sign of recovery from the abuse is
turned against victims, as in Jennifer’s case, to become the very
thing that discredits the victims as liars. 183
Similarly, victims’ previous silence about the abuse, victims’
history of no reporting, and the fact that victims depict their relationships as happy and normal are all processes that are used against
the victims to undermine their credibility, 184 as the defense attorney
did in Jennifer’s case. 185 However, these actions are normal processes of SGBV victims while they come to terms with the fact that
they have been victims of SGBV and recover from the traumatic
Scheppele, supra note 21, at 123–24. See infra Section II.B.2, for a discussion on how this script is the all-encompassing narrative for SGBV, how it came
to be, and how it drives this lack of empathy and contextual credibility bias.
178
See Hartley, supra note 21, at 539.
179
See Scheppele, supra note 21, at 144–45.
180
Id. at 140–41.
181
Id. at 139–40.
182
Id. at 140.
183
See TASLITZ, supra note 21, at 18; see also Scheppele, supra note 21, at
133.
184
See Scheppele, supra note 21, at 169–70.
185
See supra Part I.
177
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events. 186 Yet, these actions are viewed in conjunction with a discredited character to show that the abuse never happened. 187 As
Scheppele so poignantly summarizes,
[w]omen who delay in telling their stories of abuse
at the hands of men or who appear to change their
stories over time about such abuse are particularly
likely to be discredited as liars. The very fact of delay
or change is used as evidence that the delayed or
changed stories cannot possibly be true. But abused
women frequently have exactly this response: they
repress what happened; they cannot speak; they hesitate, waver, and procrastinate; they hope the abuse
will go away; they cover up for their abusers; they
try harder to be “good girls”; and they take the blame
for the abuse upon themselves. Such actions produce
delayed or altered stories over time, which are then
disbelieved for the very reason that they have been
revised. 188
Consequently, women not only face the disbelief of those closest
to them, who generally hold the contextual credibility bias and are
unable to understand why victims stay with their abusive partners, 189
but they also bear the cross of being depicted as less credible in court
when they seek to redress the wrongs committed against them. The
law facilitates discrediting these women by allowing the introduction of character for untruthfulness evidence that reinforces credibility biases. 190
The resulting credibility discount, contrary to the purposes of
evidentiary rules, 191 leads to unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
and misleading jurors and judges in their fact-finding function. 192
See Scheppele, supra note 21, at 138–39.
Id. at 145.
188
Scheppele, supra note 21, at 126–27.
189
See Franiuk et al., supra note 70, at 791.
190
See supra note 51–61 and accompanying text.
191
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 102 (stating that “[t]hese rules should be construed
so as to administer every proceeding fairly, eliminate unjustifiable expense and
delay, and promote the development of evidence law, to the end of ascertaining
the truth and securing a just determination”).
192
See Montan, supra note 38, at 459–62; see also FED. R. EVID. 403.
186
187
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Even though some confusion and prejudice could be countered
through expert testimony, corroborating evidence, similar accounts
from other victims, jury instructions, and rehabilitative testimony, it
is more difficult in practice to fight against the credibility discount.
Although expert testimony helps explain the inconsistent victim
behavior, 193 it is expensive and time consuming, 194 and thus not always accessible to the parties. 195 Also, attorneys may strategically
choose not to use expert testimony at trial to keep it shorter for both
the victims’ and jurors’ sake. 196
Similarly, jury instructions directing jurors to properly weigh the
credibility impeachment by explaining that not believing part of a
witness’s testimony does not mean that they cannot believe the rest
of a testimony might not be effective. 197
Furthermore, because of the cycle of violence or the past silence
from the victim, as in Jennifer’s case, physical corroborative evidence might not be available. 198 But even when it is available, credibility biases might diminish its value. Once a victim is impeached
as not credible, the impeachment spreads to the evidence associated
with her. 199 The same holds true to other witnesses, who are usually
related to the victim, that become tainted by association. 200
Montan, supra note 38, at 459–62
Jill Starbuck, Expert Witnesses: Worth the Time and Money?, IND.
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. F. (Sept. 20, 2012), https://iclef.org/2012/09/expertwitnesses-worth-the-time-and-money/ (explaining how “time and money are significant factors for hiring an expert witness”).
195
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Serge, 896 A.2d 1170, 1184–85 (Pa. 2006)
(discussing how states do not have an obligation to pay for an expert witness for
an indigent defendant).
196
See Starbuck, supra note 194 (discussing the time considerations made
when deciding to use an expert).
197
See Kassin & Sommers, supra note 58, at 1053 (discussing literature about
the ineffectiveness of jury instructions).
198
See Hartley, supra note 21, at 535–36; see Scheppele, supra note 21, at
155–56.
199
See GILMORE, supra note 54, at 142 (“[Doubt] may be initially withheld as
one hears an account of sexual harassment, for example, but creep[s] in as evidence is presented.”).
200
Those close to victims who are called as a witness are likely to be impeached for bias because their closeness to the victim is likely to be interpreted as
cause for their testimony to be slanted toward the victim. See Phillip W. Broadhead, Why Bias is Never Collateral: The Impeachment and Rehabilitation of Witnesses in Criminal Cases, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 235, 263 (2003).
193
194
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In terms of other victims coming forward, that strategy also requires considerable efforts, as plaintiffs will need to devote resources to finding victims and convincing them to participate in the
action even when they might have decided not to bring actions in
their own names. 201 In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision
in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis 202 might have eliminated this option
for some victims as arbitration agreements requiring individualized
proceedings are legal and might become the norm. 203
Finally, rehabilitative testimony might not be effective because
the victim’s testimony might be compromised by the biases associated with trustworthiness. The factfinders’ integrative process might
have led them to already come up with explanations as to why the
victim is allegedly lying and reaffirm that the victim should not be
believed. Thus, countering the consequential bias with the victim
herself could be even more damaging.
2. “HE SAID/SHE SAID” CREDIBILITY BIAS
The effectiveness and pervasiveness of consequential credibility
bias and the resulting credibility discounting is due to the history of
the prejudiced collective framing of SGBV. 204 As Professor Julia
Simon-Kerr has pointed out, the script of a truthful woman was
fraught with ideas about her sexual purity—equating unchastity with
untruthfulness. 205 The idea of a woman’s veracity entered early impeachment practice and jurisprudence involving women. 206 However, states ultimately barred this type of impeachment in cases
Scheppele, supra note 21, at 155.
138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018) (holding that arbitration agreements requiring
individual arbitration are enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act, irrespective of provisions in the National Labor Relations Act).
203
Najah Farley, How the US Supreme Court Could Silence #MeToo,
GUARDIAN (Apr. 18, 2018, 6:00 PM) https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/apr/18/supreme-court-metoo-arbitration-clauses-decision-sexual-harassment (discussing how corporations use forced arbitration clauses to take harassment claims into private arbitration proceedings, which prevents other women
from coming forward as they are usually kept confidential).
204
See Julia Simon-Kerr, Note, Unchaste and Incredible: The Use of Gendered Conceptions of Honor in Impeachment, 117 YALE L.J. 1854, 1879 (2008)
[hereinafter Simon-Kerr, Unchaste and Incredible].
205
See id.
206
Id. at 1169–70.
201
202
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other than rape. 207 The decision to remove it from cases other than
SGBV cases signals how SGBV cases were, and still are, socially
perceived as different from others.
This differential treatment of unchastity, as applied to women,
helped create the social script that we as a society must be careful in
SGBV cases of convicting male defendants because they can be the
victims of women’s proclivity to lie. 208 Such a script, in turn, was
embodied in the law with requirements of corroboration testimony,
prompt outcry, and cautionary jury instructions, as well as the availability of victims’ prior sexual history as impeachment and social
companion defenses. 209 However, these stereotypes and prejudices
against female victims are not issues of the past and still linger in
our impeachment practices. For example, jurisdictions that have
abolished the use of specific acts of untruthfulness to impeach a witness’s credible character have carved out exceptions for rape cases
to use this type of evidence because of the particular nature of SGBV
cases. 210
The persistence of carving out SGBV cases as ones in which we
must exercise caution with victims because they tend to lie is a direct
result of the cultural endurance of the description of SGBV cases as
“swearing contests,” “nobody really knows what happened,” or “he
said/she said” cases. 211 Professor Taslitz, who labels these phenomena as themes, pointed out that the four most common in rape cases
were silenced voices, bullying, black beasts, and a little more than
persuading. 212 This Article adopts the term “he said/she said” credibility bias to denominate the collective framing discounting of
SGBV victims and all its prejudiced and biased societal narratives.
Behind these neutral descriptions of SGBV cases lies the presumption that victims are lying about what happened to them. 213
This perceived implausibility about SGBV victims’ testimony is
built into the fabric of how we talk about these cases. 214
See id. at 1870.
See Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, supra note 28, at 181; Simon-Kerr,
Unchaste and Incredible, supra note 204, at 1875.
209
See supra notes 26–30 and accompanying text.
210
See infra Section IV.A.3.
211
See GILMORE, supra note 54, at 6–7.
212
TASLITZ, supra note 21, at 19.
213
See Colb, The Difference Between, supra note 54.
214
See, e.g., GILMORE, supra note 54, at 6–7.
207
208
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Two of the stickiest judgments that circulate in response to claims by women of sexual violence are
“he said/she said” and “nobody really knows what
happened.” . . . They render as unknowable and undecidable both physical evidence and verbal testimony. They deflect a more rigorous engagement
with narratives, persons, evidence, and scenes of
abuse that are complicated. Physical evidence is discounted when, for example, “she said” the sexual
contact that the evidence confirms was rape, but “he
says” it was consensual. . . . It represents the introduction of reasonable doubt, the legal standard by
which rape is judged in criminal court. But we should
remember also that “he said/she said” simply identifies how witnesses in an adversarial legal structure
are positioned. How “he said/she said” has come to
be seen as something other than the prompt from
which due process begins suggests that women lie
outside the frame of justice from the beginning. 215
In other words, these formulations that are depicted as neutral
portrayals of a situation in which we only have as witnesses the parties themselves serve to discredit the victims before they even
speak. 216 “They represent a free-floating form of collective judgment that attaches to testimony in the form of doubt.” 217 These formulations, coupled with contextual credibility bias, are why biases
that discount the trustworthiness of women are exacerbated in cases
of SGBV. 218 They are also the reason why the use of character for

GILMORE, supra note 54, at 6–7.
See id. at 140. Even though these narratives of “he said/she said” are presented as neutral, it is interesting to note how the speech privileges the man’s
voice by mentioning him first, notwithstanding that the accuser is usually the
woman and the person who will tell first the story. This construction signals that
the voice to which everything must be compared is the man’s. This results in a
subtler way of stating that women’s accounts of abuse we will be measured in
function of whatever the principal voice (the man’s) will say about the case.
217
Id.
218
See, e.g., Hartley, supra note 21, at 539.
215
216
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untruthfulness evidence in the impeachment of SGBV victims has
undue prejudicial effects as opposed to in other contexts. 219
As Professor Colb points out, these prejudiced scripts have consequences on the treatment of witnesses in SGBV cases, their credibility, and the perception of jurors regarding the issues being
tried. 220 Colb, reflecting on acquaintance rape vis-à-vis robbery,
states the following:
Some folks, however, make the mistake of thinking
that in order to presume innocence, we must conclude that the complaining witness in a rape case, the
alleged rape victim, is perjuring herself when she
provides incriminating testimony against the accused
rapist. They compound this mistake by imagining
that we must give as much credence to the defendant
as we do to the alleged victim and that we cannot
convict a rapist on the basis of the victim’s testimony
alone.
None of that is true. Think about a non-rape case, an
armed robbery. Juries must presume that the defendant is innocent there as well, and the prosecution
there must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to
avoid an acquittal too. Yet no one presumes that the
robbery victim, as he testifies, is lying on the stand. I
know, because I was a robbery victim, and the defense attorney bent over backwards to treat me with
respect and to make clear that he thought I might
have been mistaken but not that I might have been
lying. He is not an outlier. Juries would hate a defense attorney who approached a crime victim witness as one would approach a liar, unless, that is, the
victim accuses the defendant of acquaintance rape. 221
See GILMORE, supra note 54, at 6–7 (explaining that victim testimony is
often times the only evidence in these cases).
220
See Colb, The Difference Between, supra note 54.
221
Id.; see also House of Delegates Redefines Death, Urges Redefinition of
Rape, and Undoes the Houston Amendments, 61 A.B.A. J. 463, 464 (1975) (quoting Connie K. Borkenhagen while urging the House of Delegates to redefine
rape).
219
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As noted, the interaction between the neutral rules of allowing
character for untruthfulness evidence magnifies the credibility biases discussed. The underlying bias tends to confuse the issues for
triers of fact whose views are already skewed against SGBV victims
because of their gender identity. 222 In turn, the inherent biases in the
rules aid attorneys in achieving not guilty verdicts by creating narratives about the defendant’s innocence, victim’s tendency to lie,
and victim’s revengeful prosecutions. In Jennifer’s case, for example, these narratives imbedded in the functional evidence were the
bedrock from which the defense attorney’s cross and closing drew
support. 223
Moreover, this credibility discounting through perceived implausibility also deters victims from coming forward. 224 In fact, conviction rates seem to suggest that when attorneys employ these strategies, they are quite effective. 225
III. #TIMESUP: THE COSTS OF CHARACTER FOR UNTRUTHFULNESS
EVIDENCE IN SGBV CASES
When I testified, I had already had to watch this man’s attorney
bully, badger and harass my team, including my mother . . . I was
angry. 226
SGBV remains an alarming problem. Most of these crimes are
not prosecuted, mainly because they go unreported. 227 Organizations working in the field estimate that less than twenty-five percent
of all sexual assaults, 228 a third of all rapes, 229 and around forty percent of all stalking crimes are in fact reported. 230 Moreover, metaSee Montan, supra note 38, at 459–62.
See supra Part I.
224
Tuerkheimer, supra note 21, at 28.
225
See The Criminal Justice System: Statistics, supra note 8.
226
Zacharek et al., supra note 6 (quoting Taylor Swift).
227
See The Criminal Justice System: Statistics, supra note 8.
228
Id.
229
Andrew Van Dam, Less Than 1% of Rapes Lead to Felony Convictions. At
Least 89% of Victims Face Emotional and Physical Consequences., WASH. POST
(Oct. 6, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business /2018 /10
/06/less-than-percent-rapes-lead-felony-convictions-least-percent-victims-faceemotional-physical-consequences/.
230
KATRINA BAUM ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, STALKING VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2009),
222
223
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analysis of police and judicial statistics reveals that only one out of
six domestic violence cases reported to the police in the United
States results in conviction. 231 Furthermore, only one third of the
people arrested end up convicted. 232 “About 0.7% of rapes and attempted rapes end with a felony conviction for the perpetrator, according to an estimate based on the best of the imperfect measures
available.” 233 It is also estimated that a robbery accusation is four
times more likely to end in a conviction. 234
These numbers illustrate a twofold problem. First, a large percentage of the victims are not seeking judicial redress. 235 Second,
the ones that do go through the legal process are not receiving the
justice they deserve. 236
There are multiple reasons attributed to the low reporting rates
in these types of crimes. 237 It has been widely documented that victims do not feel comfortable going to the authorities because police
officers do not validate their accusations, and instead they are received with a new iteration of the SGBV that they have been trying
to escape. 238 As discussed, victims are received this way due to credibility discounting. 239 In addition, in many instances, women are try-

https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ovw/legacy/2012/08/15/bjs-stalkingrpt.pdf.
231
Joel H. Garner & Christopher D. Maxwell, Prosecution and Conviction
Rates for Intimate Partner Violence, 34 CRIM. JUST. REV. 44, 53 (2009).
232
Id.
233
Andrew Van Dam, Less Than 1% of Rapes Lead to Felony Convictions. At
Least 89% of Victims Face Emotional and Physical Consequences, WASH. POST
(Oct. 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/10/06/less-thanpercent-rapes-lead-felony-convictions-least-percent-victims-face-emotionalphysical-consequences/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.3fc0f7b254d2.
234
See The Criminal Justice System: Statistics, supra note 8.
235
See id.
236
See id. This conclusion presumes that most victims do not lie about their
harms. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 21, at 20 (discussing how false report rates
fall between 4.5%, 5.9%, and 6.8%).
237
See, e.g., Altantulkhuur, supra note 50, at 1109; SINOZICH & LANGTON,
supra note 137, at 9; Epstein & Goodman, supra note 93, at 431.
238
See Altantulkhuur, supra note 50, at 1109; SINOZICH & LANGTON, supra
note 137, at 9; Tuerkheimer, supra note 21, at 29.
239
See supra Part II.
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ing to avoid the negative effects that prosecuting these abuses present in their lives, such as adverse child custody determinations or
becoming the object of criminal investigations themselves. 240
Another important reason for the low reporting rate is how the
credibility discounting operates by activating trustworthiness and
plausibility biases through the impeachment of victims with character for untruthfulness evidence. 241 Victims are cognizant of that possibility and, as a result, are deterred from coming forward. 242As we
saw in Jennifer’s case, victims know that they could be doubly victimized during cross-examination. 243 They are aware that they
would have to relive their abusive experiences and subject themselves to re-enactments of the abuse and disparagement during the
trial. 244 Moreover, our adversarial system values aggressiveness
during the trial, particularly during cross-examination. 245
These problems with the adversarial system grow even deeper
when factors such as race, socio-economic position, and immigration status are thrown into the mix. 246 Not only are they accentuated

Melissa A. Trepiccione, Note, At the Crossroads of Law and Social Science: Is Charging a Battered Mother with Failure to Protect Her Child an Acceptable Solution when Her Child Witnesses Domestic Violence?, 69 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1487, 1490–91 (2001); Epstein & Goodman, supra note 93, at 431; Aiken
& Murphy, supra note 61, at 51.
241
Tom Lininger, Bearing the Cross, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1353, 1359–60
(2005).
242
See id. at 1376; Tuerkheimer, supra note 21, at 28; see also Diana Friedland, 27 Years of “Truth-in-Evidence”: The Expectations and Consequences of
Proposition 8’s Most Controversial Provision, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 27
(2009).
243
See supra Part II; see also supra notes 22–28 and accompanying text.
244
See Lininger, supra note 241, at 1359–60; TASLITZ, supra note 21, at 99.
245
TASLITZ, supra note 21, at 81–83.
246
See Capers, Evidence Without Rules, supra note 29, at 895 (discussing how
factors such as race and gender matter as “evidence” when considering plea negotiations).
240
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by extrajudicial factors or functional evidence, 247 but the legal system is increasing the harshness of cross. 248 The holdings in Crawford v. Washington, 249 Blakely v. Washington, 250 and United States
v. Booker; 251 the erosion of evidentiary privileges for accusers; 252
increasing sentences; 253 mandatory prosecutions (no-drop policies); 254 and the legality of arbitration agreements providing for individualized proceedings 255 have made indispensable the testimony
of the victims during the trial, expanded the scope of issues victims
must testify about, and strained the relationships between prosecutors and victims. 256 This, in turn, has made cross harsher and the
experience of victims worse. 257
Because of the aforementioned changes, defendants are more
likely to go to trial and contest their convictions because sentences

See id.
See Lininger, supra note 241, at 1363.
249
541 U.S. 36, 68–69 (2004) (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires a
defendant to be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine a witness making testimonial statements); see also Lininger, supra note 241, at 1363–66 (explaining
how Crawford has required victims to testify, resulting in unpleasant cross examinations of the victim).
250
542 U.S. 296, 304–05 (2004) (holding that in order for a judge to sentence
a defendant beyond the statutory maximum, the facts being relied on to support
the increase in punishment, must be submitted to the jury); see also Lininger, supra note 241, at 1367–71 (stating how Blakely has expanded proceedings that
victims would be subjected to).
251
543 U.S. 220, 244–45 (2005) (holding “that the Sixth Amendment as construed in Blakely does apply to the [Federal] Sentencing Guidelines”); see also
Lininger, supra note 241, at 1367–69 (explaining how Booker, in conjunction
with Blakely, has increased the likelihood of trials and therefore the likelihood of
victims being subject to cross-examinations).
252
Lininger, supra note 241, at 1371–74 (explaining how the erosion of
spousal privilege, self-incrimination, privilege for psychiatric and counseling records make victims less likely to wish to testify).
253
Id. at 1379–80 (explaining how increased sentences makes trials and crossexaminations more likely and more aggressive).
254
Id. at 1362 (explaining how “‘no drop’ policies in many prosecutors’ offices have added to victims’ sense of frustration during cross-examination”).
255
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018) (holding that the
Arbitration Act requires the enforcement of agreements that provide for individualized arbitration).
256
See, e.g., Lininger, supra note 241, at 1373, 1380, 1392, 1394.
257
See id. at 1363, 1373.
247
248
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could be longer, meaning the defendant has more at stake. 258 This
translates to more aggressive cross examinations of victims. 259 Furthermore, the relationship between victims and prosecutors has been
shaken, as the latter are now required to force witnesses to testify
with low expectations of prevailing or transforming the nature of
their personal and family relationships with the defendants. 260 As a
result, the tortuous process for the victim is lengthened.
As discussed, the credibility discounting women face impacts
conviction rates because credibility biases constrain victims into not
reporting and drive police officers away from going forward with
investigations. 261 Similarly, based on the convictability standard, 262
prosecutors choose not to pursue cases as they know they will not
prevail in court because jurors will discount victims’ credibility. 263
These underreporting and low conviction rates are not exclusive
to criminal proceedings—the same story repeats itself in civil cases
for sexual harassment. 264 For example, it is estimated that seventyfive percent of people who experience sexual harassment, eightythree percent of which are women, do not report it. 265 Moreover, in
the past decade, over half of the sexual harassment claims have resulted in no charge. 266

See id. at 1380.
Id.
260
Id. at 1362; Erin R. Collins, The Evidentiary Rules of Engagement in the
War Against Domestic Violence, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 397, 453 (2015).
261
See Tuerkheimer, supra note 21, at 28–32.
262
See id. at 37–38.
263
Id. at 36–41; see also Capers, Evidence Without Rules, supra note 29, at
895 (discussing how prosecutors and defense attorneys, when deciding whether
to enter plea negotiations or proceed with a case, take into account functional evidence, such as gender and the effect of credibility biases, in assessing the strength
of the evidence).
264
See, e.g., Mona Chalabi, Sexual Harassment at Work: More Than Half of
Claims in US Result in No Charge, GUARDIAN (July 22, 2016, 12:30 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/money/2016/jul/22/sexual-harassment-at-workroger-ailes-fox-news.
265
Id.
266
Charges Alleging Sex-Based Harassment, supra note 2; see also Chalabi,
supra note 264. This does not include the approximately twenty-two percent of
cases that were closed for “administrative reasons” over the last nine years.
Charges Alleging Sex-Based Harassment, supra note 2.
258
259
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Credibility discounting helps to explain some of the reasons for
low conviction rates in SGBV cases, and also gives us an explanation as to why rape shield laws have been unsuccessful in bringing
reporting and conviction rates up. 267 Notwithstanding this reality,
character for untruthfulness evidence continues to be allowed by the
FRE in SGBV cases, in spite of data showing that such evidence is
not a good predictor of whether a witness is lying 268 and that false
accusations in these cases are estimated to be less than ten percent. 269
The #MeToo movement has not only drawn attention to the
prevalence of SGBV, but also to the discounting of women’s credibility in SGBV cases and its consequences. 270 The movement has
made clear the consequences women endure by coming forward
about their experiences and how that has caused them to remain silent and not press charges or file lawsuits. 271 It has shown us how
class, race, and nationality affect the outcome in SGBV cases. 272
267
See Cassia C. Spohn & Julie Horney, The Impact of Rape Law Reform on
the Processing of Simple and Aggravated Rape Cases, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 861, 880–82 (1996); Julie Horney & Cassia C. Spohn, Rape Law
Reform and Instrumental Change in Six Urban Jurisdictions, 25 L. & SOC’Y REV.
117, 880–82 (1991); Bennett Capers, Rape, Truth, and Hearsay, 40 HARV. J. L. &
GENDER 183, 205 (2017) (“[R]ape shield rules have not protected rape victims as
hoped. . . . Rape shields certainly have not leveled the playing field for victims of
rape. Rapes remain under-reported, conviction rates remain low, and victims who
come forward continue to face demeaning and victim-blaming cross-examination
in the courtroom amounting to a ‘second victimization.’”).
268
See Victor Gold, Two Jurisdictions, Three Standards: The Admissibility of
Misconduct Evidence to Impeach, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 769, 771–72 (2008) (stating
that “a person’s behavior in a given situation cannot accurately be predicted on
the basis of personality test scores or even past behavior in a similar situation”).
269
Get Statistics, supra note 2 (stating how the prevalence of false reporting
is between two and ten percent); Tuerkheimer, supra note 21, at 20 (discussing
how false report rates fall between 4.5%, 5.9%, and 6.8%).
270
See Zacharek et al., supra note 6.
271
See id.
272
For example, if we consider Taylor Swift’s successful claim, we notice that
she is white, rich, and filed a lawsuit for the symbolic amount of one dollar. See
Hillary Weaver, Taylor Swift Has Finally Been Sent the Symbolic Dollar She Won
FAIR
(Dec.
7,
2017),
https://www.vaniin
Court,
VANITY
tyfair.com/style/2017/12/former-dj-david-mueller-says-he-sent-taylor-swift-dollar-payment. We can infer how all these factors played out in her favor by highlighting to jurors that she could not have any ulterior motive to bring charges
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More importantly, it has made evident that it is one thing to publicly
and temporarily ostracize aggressors and another to secure convictions or judgments against them. 273
Unfortunately, the #MeToo movement has also created a backlash in terms of victims’ credibility. 274 It has been reported that from
2017 to 2018 people distrust victims more and think of SGBV as an
inconvenience rather than a real problem in need of solution:
The share of American adults responding that men
who sexually harassed women at work 20 years ago
should keep their jobs has risen from 28% to 36%.
The proportion who think that women who complain
about sexual harassment cause more problems than
they solve has grown from 29% to 31%. And 18% of
Americans now think that false accusations of sexual
assault are a bigger problem than attacks that go unreported or unpunished, compared with [a previous]
13% . . . . 275
Parallel, we have seen an increase of “no cause” determinations
in sexual harassment cases and the decrease in settlements. 276
against her assailant. In fact, most of the women we have seen in the media associated with the #MeToo movement have been largely white, non-immigrant, and
wealthy. See generally Zacharek et al., supra note 6. Meanwhile, we ignore how
unsuccessful the movement has been for women of color, undocumented, in jobs
with minimum wage. See Charisse Jones, When Will MeToo Become WeToo?
Some Say Voices of Black Women, Working Class Left Out, USA TODAY,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2018/10/05/metoo-movement-lacks-diversity-blacks-working-class-sexual-harassment/1443105002/ (last updated Jan.
30, 2019, 5:13 PM).
273
Since April 2017, of the 263 celebrities, politicians, CEOs, and others who
have been accused of sexual misconduct only a few have faced legal consequences for their actions. Anna North et al., A List of People Accused of Sexual
Harassment, Misconduct, or Assault, VOX, https://www.vox.com/a/sexual-harassment-assault-allegations-list (last updated Jan. 9, 2019). This suggests that it is
easier to publicly condemn these men than to pursue legal action.
274
See, e.g., After a Year of #MeToo, American Opinion has Shifted Against
Victims, ECONOMIST (Oct. 15, 2018), https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/10/15/after-a-year-of-metoo-american-opinion-has-shifted-against-victims [hereinafter After a Year of #MeToo].
275
Id.
276
Charges Alleging Sex-Based Harassment, supra note 2.
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This backlash should serve, however, as an incentive to take advantage of the rise in awareness brought by the #MeToo movement. 277 Otherwise, the #MeToo movement could just become another chapter in the cycle of increased awareness followed by no
change, just like the movement in the ‘90s. 278
IV.

#NEVERMORE: REFORMING IMPEACHMENT OF SGBV
VICTIMS’ CHARACTER FOR TRUTHFULNESS
I have lied, but I am not a liar. 279

Some commentators have suggested that a way to deal with the
problems discussed could be to have no juries in SGBV cases. 280
That proposal goes against the core values of our criminal justice
system, 281 and it does not consider that these cases also play out in
the civil arena 282 or that judges might be as ill-equipped to deal with
the cases as jurors. 283
A more sensible way to address the problems so far discussed
would be to reform our evidentiary rules to shield victims from attacks about their character for truthfulness that play on patriarchal
prejudices and discount women’s credibility. In that way, our legal
system would guarantee a fair redress of the harms inflicted on
SGBV victims in an environment that would promote awareness and

277
See, e.g., Theodore L. Caputi et al., Research Letter: Internet Searches for
Sexual Harassment and Assault, Reporting, and Training Since the #MeToo
Movement, 179 J. INTERNAL MED. 258, 258–59 (2019).
278
See TASLITZ, supra note 21, at 6 (discussing how “[d]espite several decades of a renewed women’s movement and increasing attention to the problem of
rape, judges and juries, continue to be skeptical . . . .”); see also Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, supra note 1 (discussing how this is not the first wave of
awareness regarding SGBV).
279
Hearing with Michael Cohen, Former Attorney to President Donald
Trump: Hearing Before the H.R. Comm. on Oversight and Reform, 116th Cong.
15 (2019) [hereinafter Hearing with Michael Cohen].
280
See, e.g., Julie Bindel, Opinion, Juries Have No Place in Rape Trials. They
Simply Can’t be Trusted, GUARDIAN (Nov. 21, 2018, 8:29 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/21/juries-rape-trialsmyths-justice.
281
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
282
See Chalabi, supra note 264.
283
See, e.g., Montan, supra note 38, at 459–62.
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transform our rape and credibility discounting culture, while improving the low victim favorable outcomes in SGBV cases. Adopting evidentiary rules that would prevent attorneys from impeaching
victims with evidence of character for untruthfulness could ameliorate the revictimization of SGBV victims and foster fairer trials. It
could also incentivize victims to come forward and change the culture around SGBV. 284
A. United States Landscape on the Use of Sexual and GenderBased Violence Victims’ Character for Untruthfulness Evidence
Regulating fairly and effectively the impeachment of the character for truthfulness of a witness has historically proven to be a
challenge because, as Michael Cohen so eloquently explained, lying
does not make one a liar. 285 Legal commentators have pointed out
how the common law rule allowing evidence of the character for
untruthfulness of a witness should not be allowed as its prejudicial
effects outweigh any probative value this type of evidence could
have in any of its forms. 286 Research has questioned the commonsense notion that there is a unified trait for honesty (i.e., a character
for truthfulness) and has shown the prejudicial effects of this type of
impeachment in spite of limiting instructions. 287 In fact, jurors and
judges alike tend to overestimate or be over-persuaded by this type
of evidence, leading them to misinterpret its import. 288
Yet FRE 608 and FRE 609 allow for the admission of this type
of evidence. 289 This disconnect between the strong evidence that
The proposal in this Article is not intended to solve the problem of SGBV,
nor does it claim that the judicial system is best equipped to do so. Its scope is
more modest. It aims at removing barriers that hinder victims from redressing the
harms they have suffered. The essential premise is that, as long as we address the
problem through legal mechanisms, the redress available to victims should not be
only achievable on paper but should be achievable in actuality.
285
Hearing with Michael Cohen, supra note 279, at 15; see also Gold, supra
note 268, at 771–72.
286
See, e.g., H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character, and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing Through the Liar’s Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776, 827 (1993) (arguing
that all forms of character evidence are highly prejudicial in all of the contexts,
affecting both the judgments of judges and juries alike).
287
See Studebaker & Penrod, supra note 58, at 265–66.
288
Méndez, California’s New Law on Character Evidence, supra note 36, at
1054.
289
See FED. R. EVD. 608, 609.
284
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there is no such thing as a character for truthfulness that can be used
to predict or determine whether a person is lying on a specific occasion 290 and our insistence of using past events to ascertain the credibility of a witness 291 helps explain why we have so many issues
with the impeachment of character for truthfulness in evidentiary
law. 292 Historically, no type of evidence of character for truthfulness
(i.e., opinion, reputation, conviction, and bad acts) has been exempted from this controversy or admitted consistently in one
way. 293
1. OPINION & REPUTATION EVIDENCE
Prior to the enactment of the FRE, evidence about the character
for untruthfulness of a witness in the form of reputation was once
considered to be unreliable hearsay. 294 This type of evidence, in the
form of opinion, was excluded under the belief that it “preempt[ed]
the jury’s function as the final arbiter of fact.” 295
However, today, opinion and reputation evidence are considered
the most reliable types of evidence regarding a victim’s character
for truthfulness, and their use is widely accepted because the safeguards in place are believed to guarantee the reliability of the generalizations based on this evidence. 296 For instance, evidence in the
See Gold, supra note 268, at 771–72.
See, e.g., FED. R. EVD. 608, 609.
292
See, e.g., Lininger, supra note 241, at 1376; Tuerkheimer, supra note 21,
at 28. Although evidence suggests that character for truthfulness/untruthfulness
should not be admissible, in light of the resistance of the majority of jurisdictions
to do so, this Article does not take such position. Instead, this Article puts forward
a proposal that preserves jurisdictional reliance on this type of evidence but limits
its prejudicial effects in the context of SGBV cases.
293
See, e.g., Charles H. Kanter & Richard Page, Impeaching and Rehabilitating a Witness with Character Evidence: Reputation, Opinion, Specific Acts and
Prior Convictions, 9 U.C.D. L. REV. 319, 324 (1976); Donald H. Zeigler, Harmonizing Rules 609 and 608(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 2003, UTAH L.
REV. 635, 646–47 (2003).
294
Kanter & Page, supra note 293, at 324.
295
Id. at 327.
296
See Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, supra note 28, at 179–86 (discussing how the use of character evidence for truthfulness evolved from notions of
honor and reputation to today’s system; arguing that the current system is still
premised on notions of status as to who is culturally considered credible and not
in the seeking of mendacity).
290
291
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form of reputation is based on a pool of people that know and believe a witness possesses a trait of untruthfulness, so it should be
more reliable than evidence based on one witness’ opinion. 297 Similarly, evidence in the form of opinion is based on a larger data cluster as it requires the witness to base it on more than one act of untruthfulness. 298 Moreover, the basis for a witness’s testimony regarding reputation or opinion must be disclosed for the testimony to
be admissible. 299 This ensures the reliability of the evidence.
In sum, because of these safeguards, the likelihood of this evidence leading to a confusion of the issues is more limited, even in
SGBV cases (in spite of the credibility biases rooted in patriarchy). 300 In addition, this type of evidence is not as widely available
as evidence of specific acts. 301 Moreover, it continues to be accepted
by the majority of jurisdictions in the United States because of its
apparent reliability 302 and the required disclosure of the bases for
the opinion or reputation. 303 Therefore, a proposal to limit its prejudicial effects in the context of SGBV cases should be narrow.
Id. at 178–79.
Wilson v. City of Chicago, 6 F.3d 1233, 1239 (7th Cir. 1993), as modified
on denial of reh’g (Dec. 8, 1993) (“The telling of a lie not only cannot be equated
to the possession of a reputation for untruthfulness, but does not by itself establish
a character for untruthfulness, as the rule explicitly requires whether the form of
the impeaching evidence is evidence of reputation or opinion evidence.”).
299
See, e.g., Oregon v. Paniagua, 341 P.3d 906, 910 (Or. Ct. App. 2014) (affirming the exclusion of witness testimony who used statements of others to form
her opinion about the defendant and who did not testify to the frequency she interacted with the defendant that allowed her to form her opinion of him).
300
See Méndez, V. Witnesses, supra note 38, at 465 (“[U]nrestrained use of
evidence on witness credibility may distract and confuse jurors about the substantive issues to be decided.”); Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, supra note 28, at
207 (“This focus on ‘worthiness of belief’ is intertwined with social hierarchies
and related moral judgments that have shaped evidence jurisprudence. It has clear
repercussions for witnesses whose race or gender or both trigger distrust or disapprobation.”).
301
See Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, supra note 28, at 156 (“[I]n today’s
atomistic society, people do not have discernable reputations for truthfulness or
untruthfulness that can be accurately commented on in court.”).
302
Id. at 186 (“Most states have gradually adopted the Federal Rules’ approach to impeachment.”).
303
See, e.g., Oregon v. Paniagua, 341 P.3d 906, 910 (Or. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding witness’s personal
opinion about victim’s character for truthfulness to impeach victim’s testimony
during assault trial when witness met victim four years prior to trial but had only
297
298
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2. PRIOR CONVICTION EVIDENCE
The same could be said regarding prior convictions. Yet, impeachment by prior convictions requires more careful attention.
Even though prior convictions are a subset of specific acts, they have
historically been treated differently than prior acts of untruthfulness. 304 The difference in treatment is due, in part, to the fact that
impeachment by prior convictions developed as an impeachment
tool later in time. 305 Because being convicted of a crime historically
made most people incompetent to testify, prior convictions had no
use as an impeachment tool. 306 Once that bar was removed, prior
convictions became a previous bad act to be used to impeach the
credibility of a witness. 307 However, jurisdictions disagreed as to the
scope of impeachment based on prior convictions. 308
This disagreement persists today. 309 Jurisdictions differ on
whether only convictions of crimen falsi should be used to impeach,
whether felonies should be used, how remote a conviction must be
to be valid for impeachment, whether the impeachment should be
subject to a prejudicial analysis under FRE 403, and whether the
conviction must be automatically admitted or the court should have
discretion on its admissibility. 310
The FRE provide that a prior felony conviction for a witness,
other than the defendant, must be admitted if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. 311 However, in a
criminal case, a defendant’s prior conviction must be admitted “if
the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.” 312 Yet, for crimen falsi, the evidence must be admitted with
seen her five or six times within the last year and indicated she had formed her
opinion in part on having heard from others that victim had lied to them).
304
See Zeigler, supra note 293, at 646–47.
305
Id. at 639.
306
Id.
307
Id. at 639–40.
308
Id. at 640–41.
309
See Zeigler, supra note 293, at 662–66.
310
See id.
311
FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1)(A) (subjecting a felony conviction to the balancing test of FRE 403). FRE 403, in pertinent part states: “The court may exclude
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by . . . unfair
prejudice.” FED. R. EVID. 403 (emphasis added).
312
FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1)(B).
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no further analysis. 313 Furthermore, there is a ten-year limitation on
prior convictions evidence; for any older conviction the proponent
of the evidence must provide written notice to the adverse party and
prove that the evidence substantially outweighs the prejudicial effect. 314 The ease of admission of these types of character for untruthfulness evidence rests on the assumption that the act must be sufficiently extreme to be a crime and that it be an act that was proven
beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the witness. 315 Therefore,
the act should provide a reliable basis to judge the character of a
person. 316
Nonetheless, this type of reliance does not help explain the divergent treatment between bad acts and prior convictions, such as
the time limitation, the ability of bringing acts not related to honesty,
the differences on being subject to a balancing test, the balancing
test used, or the scope of the cross about the evidence. 317 In fact,
scholars have been pushing for the realignment of the rules regarding impeachment with prior convictions and bad acts. 318 Some of
that harmonizing has occurred. 319 However, there still exist some
discrepancies that do not make much sense. 320 For instance, attorneys are allowed to cross under FRE 608 on events that will not be
permitted under FRE 609 and get into more detailed information
about the events that should have less reliance than prior convictions. 321 Attorneys can also bring in convictions that have nothing
to do with truthfulness, but cannot use bad acts that do not involve
dishonesty. 322
See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
FED. R. EVID. 609(b).
315
See Gold, supra note 268, at 775.
316
Id.
317
Compare FED. R. EVID. 608, with FED. R. EVID. 609.
318
Zeigler, supra note 293, at 678; Okun, supra note 35, at 548–59.
319
See, e.g., Zeigler, supra note 293, at 670–71 (discussing the 1990 Amendments to FRE 609 and how the inconsistencies between 609(a) and 608(b) were
slightly remedied).
320
See, e.g., id. at 671 (discussing the inconsistencies that remain after the
1990 Amendments to FRE 609).
321
See FED R. EVID. 608, 609.
322
For example, under FRE 609, “courts permit [attorneys to ask about] the
name of the crime, the date of the crime, and the sentence imposed,” but not to go
into the conduct itself as in FRE 608. Compare FED. R. EVID. 609, with FED. R.
EVID. 608; see also Roberts, supra note 36, at 1985. Furthermore, the Supreme
313
314
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Because of the wide acceptance of prior convictions as character
for untruthfulness evidence and its limited scope on cross-examination, 323 a proposal for reform on the use of prior convictions evidence in the context of SGBV cases that is narrowly tailored to limit
the prejudicial effects of such evidence is probably more likely to be
adopted than a total overhaul of this evidentiary method. However,
the jurisdictional divergence in terms of what type of prior convictions can be used and the standards used for admissibility highlights
the need for a proposal that considers carefully the crimes covered,
the balancing test to which prior convictions should be subjected,
and its scope.
In addition, because of the lower reliability of this type of evidence vis-à-vis evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, 324 this
type of evidence could lead to confusing issues more easily and
could be used to play into the biased narratives previously explained. 325 Likewise, this type of evidence deserves more attention
because evidence in this form could include issues that are not related to credibility (crimes other than crimen falsi) 326 or be about
crimes not actually committed because of pleading strategies. 327
This evidence could also arise in more cases as it might be more
readily available than opinion or reputation evidence. 328 Thus, its
Court has held that attorneys cannot use convictions garnered in violation of the
right to counsel as impeachment evidence. Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 483
(1972); see also Roberts, supra note 36, at 1985–86.
323
See Gold, supra note 268, at 775; FED. R. EVID. 609.
324
See Gold, supra note 268, at 774.
325
See Montan, supra note 38, at 459–62. In fact, multiple scholars have advocated for the abolition of this rule. See, e.g., Brian J. Foley, Until We Fix the
Labs and Fund Criminal Defendants: Fighting Bad Science with Storytelling, 43
TULSA L. REV. 397, 413 (2007); Roberts, supra note 36, at 2036; Ted SampsellJones, Implicit Stereotyping As Unfair Prejudice in Evidence Law, 83 U. CHI. L.
REV. ONLINE 174, 189–89 (2017).
326
See FED. R. EVID. 609(a).
327
See Brandon L. Garrett, Why Plea Bargains Are Not Confessions, 57 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1415, 1425–27 (2016) (discussing plea bargaining and how a
guilty plea is not necessarily a complete admission to having committed a crime);
Roberts, supra note 36, at 1993–94.
328
Evidence of a prior conviction is more readily available because a prior
conviction is public record, whereas evidence of reputation or opinion requires a
person to come to court and testify. See Matthew Friedman, Just Facts: As Many
Americans Have Criminal Records as College Diplomas, BRENNAN CTR. FOR
JUSTICE (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-
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use as a tool to impeach character for truthfulness in SGBV cases
could have a greater effect. Consequently, the proposal to limit the
prejudicial effects of character for untruthfulness evidence in the
form of prior convictions, in the context of SGBV cases, should be
more comprehensive than the reform of this evidence in the form of
opinion or reputation.
3. PRIOR ACTS OF UNTRUTHFULNESS EVIDENCE
In the case of prior acts of untruthfulness, the reform should be
even more extensive. As scholars have pointed out, “[o]f the four
types of witness character evidence, misconduct evidence provides
the weakest basis for making a generalization about truthfulness.” 329
As discussed, a single act or multiple separate acts do not serve by
themselves to predict whether a person would lie in a particular context. 330 Moreover, specific acts are a type of evidence to which the
witness might not be prepared to respond and explain because it
could refer to events that are not memorable. 331 However, jurors
tend to give great weight to evidence of prior bad acts. 332 It is for
this reason that the admissibility of evidence of bad acts has been
restricted since the Eighteenth Century. 333 The main methods employed to restrict impeachment with bad acts have been (1) a total
ban on questioning using this type of evidence, and (2) permitting
questions on the matter during cross-examination, “but without recourse to rebuttal by extrinsic evidence if the witness denies the
acts.” 334
As explained, the FRE follow the second method. While FRE
608(b) allows the impeachment of witnesses with previous acts of
untruthfulness, FRE 403 provides, in theory, a wall against using
this evidence to impeach SGBV victims by excluding evidence
opinion/just-facts-many-americans-have-criminal-records-college-diplomas; Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, supra note 28, at 178–79.
329
Gold, supra note 268, at 774.
330
See Montan, supra note 38, at 459–62; Méndez, V. Witnesses, supra note
38, at 465–66.
331
Gold, supra note 268, at 775.
332
Id. at 775–76 (citing RICHARD E. NESBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN
INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENTS 45–46
(1980)).
333
Kanter, supra note 293, at 328–29.
334
Id. at 328.

64

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:1

whose probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury. 335 In practice,
however, even if the effects of impeachment with collateral acts of
untruthfulness could be unfairly prejudicial, confusing, or misleading to the jury because of the phenomenon of a woman’s lack of
credibility, 336 the evidence is usually admitted because it is seen as
relevant, and its probative value is not outweighed by the prejudicial
effects. 337 Thus, FRE 403 does not seem to serve as much of a safeguard to victims of SGBV.
Nor does FRE 611. As commentators have argued, even though
FRE 611 grants the court the faculty to limit the interrogation of a
witness to protect the witness from harassment or undue embarrassment, 338 “the rule does not include any concrete language indicating
what constitutes ‘harassment or undue embarrassment,’” nor is there
a solid body of case law expanding on the meaning of those terms. 339
With no definition that would include the interplay of credibility biases for SGBV victims as embarrassment or harassment beyond
what a witness would normally endure during cross-examination,
the rule serves no protection from defense strategies predicated on
the trustworthiness and plausibility biases. 340 Moreover, when an attorney uses a recognized impeachment method, courts usually presume that FRE 611 is not applicable. 341

Rule 403 provides the following:
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the
following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading
the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.
FED. R. EVID. 403.
336
See, e.g., Schafran, supra note 21, at 5.
337
A reason for that result is that judges participate also in the trustworthiness
and plausibility biases that discount victims’ credibility. See Schafran, supra note
21, at 9, 40; Gender Fairness Implementation Comm., supra note 131, at 337–40;
St. Joan, supra note 131, at 265–66.
338
See FED. R. EVID. 611.
339
Lininger, supra note 241, at 1387.
340
See supra Part II.
341
See Lininger, supra note 241, at 1387 (citing, inter alia, State v. Perolis,
398 S.E.2d 512, 517 (W. Va. 1990) (“no witness should be protected from the
embarrassment of proper impeachment”)).
335
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In sum, these protections are insufficient for victims of SGBV
in court and do not facilitate a fair trial in these types of cases. An
easy solution would be to institute a total ban on impeachment using
prior acts of untruthfulness. That would not only help in the impeachment of SGBV victims but would also address the problems
in general with this type of evidence. 342 However, most states follow
the federal scheme as pertaining to impeachment of a witness’s credibility with specific acts. 343 Therefore, such a solution does not seem
like it would have many adherents.
More importantly, even the states that limit the use of bad acts
for impeachment purposes do not have a complete ban on this type
of evidence. 344 Out of the nine states that limit evidence of specific
acts of untruthfulness, eight states have chiseled a judicial exception
for the introduction of such evidence to impeach victims in cases of
sex crimes with a prior reporting of sexual misconduct not ending in
conviction or a false accusation. 345 This is irrespective of how the
states treat other forms of evidence of untruthfulness. For example,

342
See, e.g., Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, supra note 28, at 221 (proposing an abolition on the use of reputation, opinion, and prior bad act evidence for
impeachment purposes).
343
Id. at 186.
344
See, e.g., LA. CODE EVID. art. 608(B) (“Particular acts, vices, or courses of
conduct of a witness may not be inquired into or proved by extrinsic evidence for
the purpose of attacking his character for truthfulness, other than conviction of
crime as provided in Articles 609 and 609.1 or as constitutionally required.”).
345
See infra notes 346–53 and accompanying text.
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Florida, 346 Louisiana, 347 and Massachusetts, 348 which only admit
evidence of character for truthfulness in the form of reputation and

346
FLA. STAT. §§ 90.609, 90.610 (2019). Florida courts have carved out exceptions to the admission of such evidence. See, e.g., Roebuck v. State, 953 So.
2d 40, 42 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (reversing trial court because it did not allow
the impeachment of the victim with an alleged false reporting incident based on
section 90.405(2) of the Florida Statutes, which allows proof of specific incidents
of conduct when offered to prove a particular trait of character; in this case, the
“trait of character was that the witness may be inclined to lie about sexual incidents and charge people with those acts without justification.”); Blue v. State, 8
So. 3d 454, 455 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that refusing to allow defendant to question victim about previous statements she had made and that would
have provided proof that she had made false allegations against the defendant in
the past, violated defendant’s right to a full cross-examination).
347
LA. CODE EVID. art. 608. Like Florida, Louisiana has also carved out exceptions to the admission of prior allegations. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 743 So. 2d
199, 203–04 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that a defendant may present evidence
that a victim made prior false allegations regarding sexual activity for impeachment purposes); State v. Freeman, 970 So. 2d 621, 624–26 (La. Ct. App. 2007)
(conducting a 403 analysis on the introduction of prior accusations and determining that the probative value of evidence that the victim had made prior accusations
of kidnapping and rape against a person ultimately acquitted of such charges, was
substantially outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice in subsequent aggravated
rape prosecution as the prior acquittal did not establish that victim made a false
accusation, there was no evidence that the victim ever retracted the prior allegation of abuse, and there was no independent witness to testify that the prior allegation was false).
348
The Massachusetts Guide to Evidence provides insight into the application
of the state’s rule on character evidence and provides:
The Supreme Judicial Court has “chiseled” a narrow exception
to the rule that the testimony of a witness may not be impeached
with specific acts of prior misconduct, recognizing that in special circumstances (to date, only rape and sexual assault cases)
the interest of justice would forbid its strict application. Commonwealth v. LaVelle, 414 Mass. at 151–152. In Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 94–96 (1978), the special
circumstances warranting evidence of the prior accusations
were that (1) the witness was the victim in the case on trial; (2)
the victim/witness’s consent was the central issue at trial; (3)
the victim/witness was the only Commonwealth witness on the
issue of consent; (4) the victim/witness’s testimony was inconsistent and confused; and (5) there was a basis in independent
third-party records for concluding that the victim/witness’s
prior accusation of the same type of crime had been made and
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prior convictions, have recognized an exception in the case of sexual
crimes. Likewise, Alaska, 349 Illinois, 350 New Jersey, 351 Oregon, 352
and Texas, 353 which have a broader recognition of reputation and
prior conviction evidence, have also recognized such an exception.

was false. Not all of the Bohannon circumstances must be present for the exception to apply. Commonwealth v. Nichols, 37
Mass. App. Ct. 332, 337 (1994).
MASS. GUIDE EVID. 608 note to subsection (b).
349
ALASKA R. EVID. 608. Alaska courts have also carved out exceptions for
prior false accusations. See, e.g., Morgan v. State, 54 P.3d 332, 336 (Alaska Ct.
App. 2002) (holding that “if the defendant proves that a complaining witness has
made prior false accusations of sexual assault (under the rules explained in the
next section of this opinion), the defendant is not limited to cross-examining the
complaining witness concerning these prior accusations. Rather, the defendant
can both cross-examine the complaining witness and present extrinsic evidence
on this point.”).
350
ILL. R. EVID. 608. Likewise, Illinois has carved an exception. See, e.g.,
State v. Visgar, 457 N.E.2d 1343, 1350 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (deciding that daughter’s prior allegation of sexual misconduct by defendant did not warrant a psychiatric examination where defendant had opportunity to attempt to impeach her during cross-examination with regard to such allegation); State v. Alexander, 452
N.E.2d 591, 595 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (holding that “[t]he trial court did not err in
ruling that evidence of prior rape complaints by the victim are inadmissible where
defendant was unable to show that the prior complaints were unfounded”) (emphasis added).
351
N.J. R. EVID. 608. In addition to Alaska and Illinois, New Jersey has carved
out exceptions in cases of sexual violence. See, e.g., State v. Guenther, 854 A.2d
308, 324–25 (N.J. 2004) (recognizing in criminal cases an exception to the rule of
evidence barring the admission of specific instances of conduct to attack a witness’s character for truthfulness that allow a defendant to introduce evidence that
the victim has made a prior false criminal accusation when the credibility of the
victims is the central issue in the case, and where the proof of the false accusation
is not a diversion so that it would overshadow the trial of the charges itself). New
Jersey has even included its exception in the text of the rule. See N.J. R. EVID.
608(b).
352
OR. EVID. CODE § 608. Similarly, Oregon has an exception to its rule on
the use of prior accusations. See, e.g., State v. LeClair, 730 P.2d 609, 615 (Or. Ct.
App. 1986) (concluding that the confrontation clause “requires that the court permit a defendant to cross-examine the complaining witness with other accusations
she has made if 1) she has recanted them, 2) the accusations were false, or 3) there
is some evidence that the victim has made prior false accusations that were
false.”).
353
TEX. R. EVID. 608. In addition, Texas has carved an exception for prior
false accusations. See, e.g., Lopez v. State, 18 S.W.3d 220, 225–26 (Tex. Crim.
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The justifications for allowing evidence of prior reporting without a conviction and false accusations to be admitted at trial vary
from the right to confrontation, 354 to the history of exceptions to the
bar on character evidence, 355 to courts’ expansive interpretations of
the evidentiary rules. 356 There is an even greater variance amongst
jurisdictions in terms of (1) whether to allow the use of extrinsic
evidence to prove the existence of a prior bad act; (2) whether evidence of a prior non-conviction reported by third parties is admissible; (3) what the standard of admissibility should be regarding extrinsic evidence of prior non-conviction acts; (4) whether a hearing
should be conducted to determine admissibility of extrinsic evidence; (5) whether it can be proven that the allegation of a prior bad
act is false; (6) how remote the reported prior non-conviction can be
from the crime charged; and (7) what the proper scope of extrinsic
evidence used to prove the existence of a prior non-conviction bad
act should be. 357
The point of convergence, however, is the admission of a prior
no-conviction reporting in cases of SGBV and no other types of
cases, 358 illustrating how the persistence of credibility discounting
still drives and informs the decision-making process in admitting

App. 2000) (acknowledging that the confrontation clause may require allowing
impeachment with prior false accusations).
354
See, e.g., Lopez, 18 S.W.3d at 225–26 (acknowledging that the confrontation clause may require allowing impeachment with prior false accusations, but
declining to admit such evidence); State v. Barber, 766 P.2d 1288, 1290 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1989) (explaining how evidence of prior false accusations are relevant to the
defendant’s confrontation rights, but declining to admit the alleged evidence because there was no indication of prior false accusations on behalf of the victim).
355
See e.g., Morgan v. State, 54 P.3d 332, 335 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002) (explaining that courts have allowed this type of evidence “consistent with the common-law doctrine that a party could present evidence of a witness’s ‘corruption’—
a term that encompassed evidence of (1) the witness’s general willingness to lie
under oath, (2) the witness’s offer to give false testimony for money or other reward, (3) the witness’s acknowledgement of having lied under oath on prior occasions, (4) the witness’s attempt to bribe another witness, or (5) the witness’s
pattern of presenting false legal claims.”).
356
See, e.g., Guenther, 854 A.2d at 326.
357
See Zeigler, supra note 293, at 666–73.
358
A Westlaw search using the Boolean terms and connectors “‘prior false
allegations’ /s credibility” shows that the exceptions are made in SGBV cases.
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this type of evidence. 359 Admitting this type of evidence does not
incorporate an analysis of the inherent process of victims in recanting accusations and revising accounts. 360 This failure ignores what
we know about victims’ processing of the aggression and uses the
evidence of a prior no-conviction reporting to the detriment of the
victim to show that she must be lying in the current instance. Such
an admission disregards that there are many reasons that a victim’s
prior report resulted in a no-conviction, and that a prior report with
a no-conviction does not automatically mean that the victim is lying. 361
Yet, the creation of exceptions to the admission of prior no-conviction reporting signals what might be truly relevant in specific acts
of untruthfulness: whether the witness has lied in the past and has
misused the judicial system in a similar context or in an analogous
manner to the one in which she is currently a witness. This would
not be to show the victim’s propensity to lie, but to show some kind
of modus operandi or pattern by the victim, or to prove the victim’s
bias or fabrication. 362 However, because of the way in which some
of these prior victim reporting exceptions are formulated, in practice
the exceptions do not necessarily address these arguably valid
goals. 363 Admitting a victim’s prior no-conviction reporting without
See, e.g., State v. Long, 140 S.W.3d 27, 31 (Mo. 2004) (en banc) (“The
current Missouri rule prohibiting extrinsic evidence of prior false allegations does
not strike the appropriate balance. Therefore, a criminal defendant in Missouri
may, in some cases, introduce extrinsic evidence of prior false allegations. This
rule is not limited to sexual assault or rape cases.”).
360
See Scheppele, supra note 21, at 138–40.
361
See, e.g., Tuerkheimer, supra note 21, at 30–33 (discussing how reported
SGBV cases have been mishandled by police leading to no arrest and rape kits
sitting on shelves never to be tested).
362
See, e.g., State v. Botelho, 753 A.2d 343, 346 (R.I. 2000).
363
See id. (stating “that evidence of similar accusations by a complaining witness may be admissible to challenge the witness’s credibility. . . . The evidence
may be admissible even when the allegations were never proven false or were
never withdrawn. . . . [R]egardless of whether the accusations were made before
or after those made in respect to a defendant.”) (internal citations omitted); People
v. Diaz, 85 A.D.3d 1047, 1050 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (explaining that “[e]vidence
of a complainant’s prior false allegations of rape or sexual abuse is admissible to
impeach the complainant’s credibility [if the] defendant establishe[s] that the
[prior] allegation may have been false[, and] . . . that the particulars of the complaints, the circumstances or manner of the alleged assaults, or the currency of the
359

70

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:1

further analysis, even in cases of false accusations, can be problematic. First, it goes against studies regarding a victim’s process of
coming forward. 364 Blind admission of prior reports assumes that
such a specific act, in and of itself, proves that the victim might be
currently lying when we know that that might not be the case, 365
especially in SGBV cases where recanting is a natural occurrence
not always associated with untruthfulness. 366 Second, not requiring
a showing that the victim is currently misusing the judicial system,
even in cases of prior false allegations, makes the relevancy of this
evidence weak, 367 especially in cases trying to prove pattern, bias,
or fabrication. Moreover, it unduly prejudices the testimony of the
victims as triers of fact can be over-persuaded by this type of evidence. 368
One commentator, Kassandra Altantulkhuur, has focused on the
admittance of these specific acts (i.e., prior no-conviction reporting). 369 Altantulkhuur proposes requiring, in a separate hearing, “a
defendant [who] seeks to use such information . . . to prove [that]
complaints were such as to suggest a pattern casting substantial doubt on the validity of the charges made by the complainant, it is error for the trial court to preclude evidence regarding the prior allegation.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Rayner v. Georgia, 706 S.E.2d 205, 210 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011)
(holding that “[e]vidence of prior false allegations of sexual misconduct is admissible to attack the witness’s credibility and as substantive evidence in support of
the argument that the charged offense did not occur. However, to protect the complaining witness from unfounded allegations that the witness has made similar
false allegations in the past, before such evidence can be admitted, the trial court
is required to make a threshold determination outside the jury’s presence that a
reasonable probability of falsity exists.”) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted); Blair v. State, 877 N.E.2d 1225, 1233–34 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (noting
that “[e]vidence of prior false accusations may be admitted only if 1) the complaining witness admits that she had made a prior false accusation of rape; or 2)
the accusation is demonstrably false.”); Tibbs v. Allen, 486 F. Supp. 2d 188, 196
(D. Mass. 2007) (observing that under Massachusetts law, evidence of an alleged
rape victim’s prior false allegations of rape is “admissible [ ] only when there is a
pattern of prior false accusations; one false accusation does not a pattern make.”).
364
See Scheppele, supra note 21, at 138–40.
365
See Okun, supra note 35, at 546–49, 565–66; Roberts, supra note 36, at
1996; Méndez, California’s New Law on Character Evidence, supra note 36, at
1051–53; Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, supra note 28, at 208–209.
366
See Tuerkheimer, supra note 21, at 17–18.
367
See Johnson, supra note 21, at 372.
368
See, e.g., Gold, supra note 268, at 775–76.
369
Altantulkhuur, supra note 50, at 1097–99.
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the prior accusation is demonstrably false.” 370 Her proposal “would
require defendants to show by clear, convincing, and substantial
proof that the victim actually made a false accusation.” 371 Once that
determination is made, the court should consider the prejudicial effect of allowing the evidence, barring admission of the no-conviction report if the court determines that the defendant is only trying
to prove propensity. 372
Although such a proposal would deal with the problems of allowing impeachment through a prior no-conviction reporting, it
would distract the court from the real issue, which is the current accusation. 373 It would also mean having a new trial within a trial,
which would mean more resources, time, and money spent litigating
this issue. 374 While Altantukhuur’s proposal deals with some of the
issues of specific acts of untruthfulness, 375 it does not deal with all
of them and ignores the type of specific acts of untruthfulness that
can be introduced in more than eighty percent of jurisdictions; further demonstrating the need for a rule that is more comprehensive to
protect victims of SGBV and facilitate the fair trial of these types of
cases.
The need for a more comprehensive rule becomes more apparent
when we consider the only jurisdiction in the United States that previously implemented a total bar on the use of prior acts of untruthfulness as impeachment evidence: California. Prior to 1982, California had a complete bar on the use of specific acts evidence in both
criminal and civil cases. 376 However in 1982, voters approved the
Right to Truth in Evidence Proposition amendment to the California
Id. at 1120–21.
Id. at 1121.
372
Id. at 1121–22.
373
See Montan, supra note 38, at 460 (“One of the general dangers presented
by specific-instance character evidence is the potential to confuse or distract the
jury from the substantive issues being tried. Evidence of specific acts is usually
not relevant to the issues being tried, which can create a danger of confusion for
the jury.”).
374
See id. at 463.
375
See generally, Altantulkhuur, supra note 50.
376
Miguel A. Méndez, Comparing the Federal Rules of Evidence with the
California Evidence Code-Proposition 8 and the Wisdom of Using Initiatives As
A Rule-Making Device, 36 SW. U. L. REV. 571, 577 (2008); Miguel A. Méndez,
Resurrecting California’s Old Law on Character Evidence, 23 PAC. L.J. 1005,
1008 (1992).
370
371

72

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:1

evidence rules to prevent the exclusion (with few exceptions) of relevant evidence in criminal proceedings. 377 With the enactment of
the amendment, the bar against the use of prior acts existed only in
the civil context, while in the criminal setting the rules are even more
liberal than their federal counterpart. 378 As a result, California had
fewer victims reporting crimes in categories such as sexual abuse
and domestic violence. 379 Rape crisis counselors stated under oath
that they knew of victims who decided not to come forward because
of the reform in the law. 380 This information from California suggests a correlation between the use of character for untruthfulness
impeachment strategies and under-reporting, under-prosecution,
and under-conviction. 381 Moreover, the change in victim reporting
after California’s change in its evidentiary laws suggests that victims are less likely to come forward when the defendant can inquire
into character for untruthfulness evidence. 382
Like California, Tennessee has also distanced itself from the
FRE in terms of the use of prior acts of untruthfulness as impeachment evidence. Although Tennessee does allow specific acts of untruthfulness to be used during impeachment, it allows this only after
a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine the factual
basis and probative value of the prior act if the act was done within
10 years of the commencement of the current action. 383 If the specific act is older than 10 years, the court is required to consider the
Friedland, supra note 242, at 5.
Id. at 7–8.
379
See id. at 27.
380
Id.
381
Establishing a causal link between the under-adjudication in favor of victims and the use of prior acts of untruthfulness to impeach victims’ character for
untruthfulness is extremely difficult as there are many variables that cannot be
controlled in a study. For example, it is difficult to compare jurisdictions that have
more limited rules than the FRE, such as Alaska, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oregon, Tennessee, and Texas, with jurisdictions that
have adopted FRE 608(b) because the existence of other rules and procedures that
are different in those jurisdictions can affect the outcome, and therefore, impede
the establishment of a causal link. Moreover, there is little to no point in only
looking at statistics within jurisdictions that completely bar the use of prior acts
because such a ban on prior bad acts evidence would apply, for the most part,
across the board to all adjudications, not just in SGBV cases.
382
Friedland, supra note 242, at 27, 29.
383
Rule 608 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence, titled “Evidence of Character and Conduct of Witness,” provides:
377
378
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(a) Opinion and Reputation Evidence of Character – The
credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by
evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject
to these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked.
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct – Specific instances of conduct of a witness for the purpose of attacking or supporting
the witness’s character for truthfulness, other than convictions of crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved
by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, if probative of
truthfulness or untruthfulness and under the following conditions, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness concerning the witness’s character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness or concerning the character for truthfulness
or untruthfulness of another witness as to which the character witness being cross-examined has testified. The conditions which must be satisfied before allowing inquiry on
cross-examination about such conduct probative solely of
truthfulness or untruthfulness are:
(1) The court upon request must hold a hearing outside the
jury’s presence and must determine that the alleged
conduct has probative value and that a reasonable factual basis exists for the inquiry;
(2) The conduct must have occurred no more than ten years
before commencement of the action or prosecution,
but evidence of a specific instance of conduct not qualifying under this paragraph (2) is admissible if the proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance
notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of
such evidence and the court determines in the interests
of justice that the probative value of that evidence,
supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect; and
(3) If the witness to be impeached is the accused in a criminal prosecution, the State must give the accused reasonable written notice of the impeaching conduct before trial, and the court upon request must determine
that the conduct’s probative value on credibility outweighs its unfair prejudicial effect on the substantive
issues. The court may rule on the admissibility of such
proof prior to the trial but in any event shall rule prior
to the testimony of the accused. If the court makes a
final determination that such proof is admissible for
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prejudicial effect of the evidence, as compared to the probative
value. 384 Although this safeguard is a great addition, it might not
protect victims of SGBV effectively. The standard to allow the specific acts is whether it has probative value and a reasonable factual
basis for the inquiry. 385 While this standard is better than the current
good faith basis usually employed to determine whether an attorney
can question about a prior bad act, 386 it is still a pretty low standard
to meet, considering that socially, we overvalue prior acts of untruthfulness as predictors of character for truthfulness. 387 Moreover,
as discussed supra Part II, if judges do not have more particularized
guidance on allowing that type of evidence in cases of SGBV, they
will fail to see the need to exclude it, as they operate as the rest of
society under the credibility biases associated with women and victims. 388
In fact, case law applying Tennessee’s Rule of Evidence 608
suggests that when more specific guidance is given to judges, issues

impeachment purposes, the accused need not actually
testify at the trial to later challenge the propriety of the
determination.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any
other witness, does not operate as a waiver of the witness’s privilege against self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters which relate only to character for truthfulness.
(c) Juvenile Conduct – Evidence of specific instances of conduct of a witness committed while the witness was a juvenile is generally not admissible under this rule. The court
may, however, allow evidence of such conduct of a witness
other than the accused in a criminal case if the conduct
would be admissible to attack the credibility of an adult and
the court is satisfied that admission in evidence is necessary for a fair determination in a civil action or criminal
proceeding.
TENN. R. EVID. 608.
384
TENN. R. EVID. 608(b)(2).
385
Id.
386
See United States v. Nixon, 777 F.2d 958, 970 (5th Cir. 1985); United
States v. Ruiz-Castro, 92 F.3d 1519, 1528–29 (10th Cir. 1996).
387
See, e.g., Gold, supra note 268, at 775–76.
388
See, e.g., St. Joan, supra note 131, at 265–66.
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related to the prejudicial effects of character evidence for truthfulness can be reduced. 389 For example, in a rape case, the trial and the
appellate court following Tennessee’s Rule of Evidence 608 excluded evidence of the victim’s bad checks and fraudulent conduct
during marriage because the lower court found no reasonable basis
for the questions and because of the remoteness of the conduct. 390
Accordingly, a rule to better regulate the use of prior acts in cases of
SGBV should include more specific standards rather than a good
faith basis and FRE 403 and 611 protections.
In sum, the current landscape on the impeachment of character
for truthfulness illustrates the need for a rule that protects SGBV
victims during cross-examination. No state has such a protection.
Moreover, as discussed, the limited protections against the prejudicial effects of evidence for untruthful character do not require evidence of a victim’s untruthfulness to be related to current specific
acts of misusing the judicial system, nor do the protections consider
how attorneys use this evidence to argue cases predicated on the societal credibility discounting of SGBV victims. 391
B. Proposed Rule for the Impeachment of SGBV Victims’
Character for Truthfulness
The proposal presented here attempts to fill the gaps in the FRE
in a way that could help transform society’s perception of women’s
credibility and SGBV victims. Considering that the majority of jurisdictions, in one way or another, follow the FRE, 392 the language
used in the proposal is based on the language employed by the FRE.
New language is italicized, while existing FRE language remains in
plain typeface.
The Rule envisions three different balancing tests depending on
the type of character for truthfulness evidence and lists concrete factors to aid courts in weighing the probative value of the character for
untruthfulness evidence against its prejudicial effects, specifically
in SGBV cases. It also provides for a hearing presided over by a

See, e.g., State v. Manning, No. 03C01-9501-CR-00012, 1998 WL 103317,
at *14 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 27, 1998).
390
Id.
391
See supra Part II.
392
See Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, supra note 28, at 186.
389
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separate judge when the evidence at issue is character for untruthfulness evidence in the form of specific instances. The proposed rule
attempts to temper the prejudicial effects caused by credibility biases while balancing other considerations, such as a long-standing
tradition of impeaching witnesses with evidence for untruthfulness,
the constitutional protections in criminal cases, and judicial efficiency. This procedure would ensure that SGBV victims enjoy a
more impartial trial, while preserving the core values of our criminal
and probative systems.
Rule 101X. SCOPE; DEFINITIONS
***
(b) Definitions.
***
(7) “sexual and gender-based violence cases” refers to criminal
or civil cases regarding intimate partner violence, sexual assault,
rape, sexual harassment, and stealthing.
Rule 403X. EXCLUDING RELEVANT EVIDENCE FOR
PREJUDICE, CONFUSION, WASTE OF TIME, OR OTHER
REASONS
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury,
undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.
Rule
608X.
WITNESS’S
CHARACTER
FOR
TRUTHFULNESS OR UNTRUTHFULNESS
(a) Reputation or Opinion Evidence.
A witness’s credibility may be attacked or supported by testimony about the witness’s reputation for having a character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or by testimony in the form of an opinion
about said character.
In cases involving sexual and gender-based violence, if the only
testimony to support the character for untruthfulness of the victim is
in the form of an opinion or reputation provided by the defendant,
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the court may admit the evidence if it determines, following the factors enumerated in Rule 416X(b)(4), that the probative value of the
evidence substantially outweighs its prejudicial effects.
Evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the witness’s character for truthfulness has been attacked.
(b) Prior Convictions.
(1) In General. The following rules apply to attacking a witness’s character for truthfulness by evidence of a criminal conviction:
(a) for a crime that, in the convicting jurisdiction, was punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one year, the evidence:
(i) must be admitted, subject to Rule 403X, in a civil case or in
a criminal case in which the witness is not a defendant, except as
provided in (ii);
(ii) in a civil or criminal sexual and gender-based violence case,
the prior conviction of the victim must be admitted only after the
court determines, following the factors enumerated in Rule
416X(b)(4) and any evidence of an incentive to plead, that the probative value of the evidence about the victim’s character for untruthfulness is not outweighed or closely balanced by its prejudicial effect; and
(iii) must be admitted in a criminal case in which the witness is
a defendant, if the probative value of the evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect to that defendant;
(b) for any crime regardless of the punishment that, in the convicting jurisdiction, required proving—or the witness’s admitting—
a dishonest act or false statement, the evidence:
(i) must be admitted, subject to Rule 403X, in a civil case or in
a criminal case except as provided in (ii); and
(ii) in a civil or criminal sexual and gender-based violence case,
the prior conviction of the victim must be admitted only after the
court determines, following the factors enumerated in Rule
416X(b)(4) and any evidence of an incentive to plead, that the probative value of the evidence about the victim’s character for untruthfulness substantially outweighs its prejudicial effects.
(2) Limit on Using the Evidence After 5 Years. This subdivision
(2) applies if more than 5 years have passed since the witness’s con-
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viction or release from confinement for it, whichever is later. Evidence of the conviction is admissible after the proponent gives the
adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to use it, so that
the party has a fair opportunity to contest its use, only if:
(a) its probative value, supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect;
(b) in a case of a victim’s prior conviction in a sexual and gender-based violence case, after the court determines following the
factors enumerated in Rule 416X(b)(4) that the probative value of
the evidence is not outweighed or closely balanced by its prejudicial
effect; and
(c) the proponent gives an adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to use it so that the party has a fair opportunity to
contest its use.
(3) Effect of a Pardon, Annulment, or Certificate of Rehabilitation. Evidence of a conviction is not admissible if:
(a) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment,
certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent procedure based on
a finding that the person has been rehabilitated, and the person has
not been convicted of a later crime punishable by death or by imprisonment for more than one year; or
(b) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment,
or other equivalent procedure based on a finding of innocence.
(4) Juvenile Adjudications. Evidence of a juvenile adjudication
is admissible under this rule only if:
(1) it is offered in a criminal case;
(2) the adjudication was of a witness other than the defendant;
(3) an adult’s conviction for that offense would be admissible to
attack the adult’s credibility; and
(4) admitting the evidence is necessary to fairly determine guilt
or innocence.
(5) Pendency of an Appeal. A conviction that satisfies this rule
is admissible even if an appeal is pending. Evidence of the pendency
is also admissible.
(c) Prior Acts of Untruthfulness. (Specific Instances of Conduct)
Except for a criminal conviction under the special rules provided in section (b) of this rule, extrinsic evidence is not admissible
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to prove specific instances of a witness’s conduct to attack or support the witness’s character for truthfulness. But the court may, on
cross-examination, allow the opposing party to inquire into such
specific acts of untruthfulness if they are probative of the character
for truthfulness or untruthfulness of:
(1) the witness; or
(2) another witness whose character the witness being cross-examined has testified about.
If the character for truthfulness being called into question is that
of a victim in a sexual and gender-based violence case, the court
must follow the procedure established in Rule 416X before allowing
the impeachment with a prior act of untruthfulness.
By testifying on another matter, a witness does not waive any
privilege against self-incrimination for testimony that relates only to
the witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.
Rule 416X. IMPEACHMENT OF SEXUAL AND GENDERBASED VIOLENCE VICTIMS WITH PRIOR ACTS OF
UNTRUTHFULNESS
(a) Requirement of a Hearing Presided Over by a Different
Judge.
In any civil or criminal sexual and gender-based violence case,
the defense may inquire into specific acts of untruthfulness of the
victim, provided that the court in a hearing presided over by a separate judge or magistrate, determines, following the procedures set
out in this rule, that the evidence about the victim’s character for
untruthfulness is not outweighed or is closely balanced by its prejudicial effect, the confusion regarding the issues to be adjudicated,
or the possibility of misleading the jury.
(b) Procedure to Determine Admissibility.
(1) Motion. A defendant that intends to offer evidence about the
character for untruthfulness of a sexual and gender-based violence
victim, in the form of specific acts must:
1. file a motion that specifically states the intention to use evidence in the form of specific acts to impeach the character for truthfulness of the victim, and lists and describes the specific acts of untruthfulness;
2. do so at least 14 days prior to the commencement of the trial,
unless the court, for good cause, sets a different time before trial;
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i. in all civil cases, if the defendant does not file the motion
within the period established, the defendant will waive the right to
present such evidence;
ii. in all criminal cases, if the defendant does not file the motion
before the commencement of the trial, the defendant must at least do
so before the victim testifies; if not the defendant will waive his right
to present such evidence, unless the Court determines that said evidence is of exculpatory nature;
3. serve the motion on all parties; and
4. notify the victim or, when appropriate, the victim’s guardian
or representative.
(2) Evidence to be Presented by the Defendant. The defendant
can present evidence of the following:
1. the specific acts of untruthfulness;
2. how those specific acts are related to a claim that the victim
is currently misusing the judicial system or has done so in the past;
3. the victim maliciously or falsely filed civil or criminal sexual
and gender-based violence actions in the past;
4. the victim intends to cause harm to the defendant beyond the
negative effects commonly associated with a judicial action by filing
the current cause of action;
5. proof of the victim’s character for untruthfulness; and
6. any other evidence that would make the use of specific acts
of untruthfulness more reliable.
The use of extrinsic evidence is allowed. Such use of extrinsic
evidence is exclusively for the purposes of the hearing under this
Rule.
(3) Evidence to be Presented by the Victim or on the Victim’s
behalf. The prosecution, the plaintiff, or the Appointed Attorney can
present evidence of the following:
1. the character for truthfulness of the victim;
2. the lack of evidence about the victim currently misusing the
judicial system or having done so in the past;
3. the remoteness of the specific acts;
4. any evidence to rebut the veracity of the specific act of untruthfulness;
5. testimony explaining the recanting of charges; or
6. any other evidence that would make the use of specific acts
of untruthfulness less reliable.
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The use of extrinsic evidence is allowed. Such use of extrinsic
evidence is exclusively for the purposes of the hearing under this
Rule. The victim is not required to present any evidence in order for
the court to make its determination.
(4) Factors to Consider. In making its determinations in (5) and
(6), the court should consider the following factors:
1. amount and scope of the evidence of character for untruthfulness;
2. how the evidence proves character for untruthfulness;
3. how the evidence of character for untruthfulness is related
to a claim that the victim is currently misusing the judicial system
or has done so in the past;
4. remoteness of the specific acts;
5. evidence of the veracity or falsity of the acts, the opinion, or
reputation;
6. evidence of the victim maliciously or falsely filing civil or
criminal sexual and gender-based violence actions in the past;
7. evidence of the character for truthfulness of the victim;
8. evidence explaining the recanting or presentation of previous allegations of sexual and gender-based violence; and
9. any other evidence that would speak to the reliability of using the evidence to determine character for untruthfulness or truthfulness.
(5) Probative Value Outweighed. After the hearing, if the court
determines that the probative value of the evidence of the victim’s
untruthful character is closely balanced or outweighed by the unfair
prejudice to the victim’s testimony, the confusion regarding the issues to be adjudicated, or the possibility of misleading the jury or
the judge, the court will issue a written order stating that any line of
inquiry into those issues will not be allowed during the trial and the
defense will be sanctioned if it disregards said order. In making such
determination the court must balance the probative value of the evidence and its prejudicial effect considering the factors listed in Rule
416X(b)(4).
(6) Concerns Outweighed. After the hearing, if the Court determines that the probative value of the evidence of the victim’s untruthful character is not closely balanced nor outweighed by the unfair prejudice to the victim’s testimony, the confusion regarding the
issues to be adjudicated, or the possibility of misleading the jury or
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the judge, the court will issue an order stating which specific acts
may be inquired into during cross-examination in the trial with the
purpose of impeaching the victim’s character for truthfulness. The
scope of such cross-examination will be limited to the occurrence of
the specific act in question. In making such determination the court
must balance the probative value of the evidence and its prejudicial
effect considering the factors listed in Rule 416X(b)(4).
(7) Appointment of Attorney Under Special Circumstances. In
criminal cases, if the court understands that the interests of the victim are not being adequately represented by the State,or the victim’s
safety is in peril, the court may appoint an attorney to represent the
victim during the hearing or the victim’s testimony in trial. In all
civil cases, if the court determines that self-representation could result in undue psychological burden to the victim or the victim’s
safety is in peril, the court may appoint an attorney to represent the
victim during the hearing or the victim’s testimony in trial.
(8) Sealed Hearing and Materials. Unless the court orders otherwise, the motion, related materials, and the record of the hearing
must be and remain sealed.
C. Advisory Comments on the Rule
As can be inferred, the purpose of the Rule is to prevent attorneys from accessing credibility biases based on trustworthiness and
plausibility and using them as part of their defense to discount the
victim’s testimony, while respecting the reliance jurisdictions grant
to character evidence for untruthfulness. To do so, the Rule attempts
to temper our knowledge of the phenomenon that evidence of character for untruthfulness is not a good predictor of a witness lying
during a trial with the well-established practice of admitting this
type of evidence in judicial proceedings, especially in SGBV cases.
To balance all of the interests at stake, including the right of confrontation, the Rule envisions the use of three different standards
which depend on the form of the evidence for character for untruthfulness and its perceived reliability as a predictor of a witness lying.
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1. BALANCING TESTS
For evidence that is perceived to be most reliable—evidence in
the form of reputation or opinion—for determining a witness’s character for untruthfulness, 393 the standard would remain the one set
forth in FRE 403. On the other hand, for categorically less reliable
evidence, such as prior convictions and specific acts of untruthfulness, 394 the proposed Rule establishes two different standards and
instructs the court to take into account specific factors associated
with SGBV cases, such as the inherent biases involved in these types
of cases. These factors will aid the court in making a more accurate
determination of the prejudicial effects of character for untruthfulness evidence in SGBV cases. The two different standards available
for such an analysis also recognize that there is a diverse degree of
perceived reliability of the various forms of character for untruthfulness evidence. 395
For prior convictions other than crimen falsi and specific acts of
untruthfulness, which have been categorized as the least reliable
form of character evidence, 396 the Rule provides a more stringent
standard: impeachment with character for untruthfulness evidence
is prohibited if the probative value of the evidence of the victim’s
untruthful character is closely balanced or outweighed by the unfair
prejudice to the victim’s testimony, the confusion regarding the issues to be adjudicated, or the possibility of misleading the jury or
the judge. However, for prior convictions for crimen falsi, evidence
in the form of opinion or reputation supported solely by the defendant, or prior convictions older than five years, the standard would be
an intermediate balancing test as to whether the probative value substantially outweighs the prejudicial effects.
2. SEPARATE HEARING FOR DETERMINING IMPEACHMENT WITH
PRIOR ACTS OF UNTRUTHFULNESS

See Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, supra note 28, at 179–86 (discussing the use of reputation and opinion evidence over time and the reliance on such
evidence).
394
See Gold, supra note 268, at 774.
395
Compare Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, supra note 28, at 179–86, with
Gold, supra note 268, at 774.
396
See Gold, supra note 268, at 774.
393
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In the case of specific acts, the Rule also requires a hearing presided over by a separate judge or magistrate. As discussed, prior acts
of untruthfulness are the least reliable type of character for untruthfulness evidence but the most persuasive in leading a fact finder to
think that a witness is lying. 397 Thus, in order to balance the right of
confrontation in criminal cases and the extended practice of relying
on evidence of character for untruthfulness with specific act evidence’s inherently prejudicial effects, 398 the Rule contemplates both
a hearing and a more stringent standard to determine whether this
type of evidence should be admitted.
Contrary to the proceeding laid out in Tennessee’s Rule of Evidence 608 or a Daubert hearing, 399 the proposed Rule requires a
hearing to be presided over by a judge other than the one that will
be presiding over the underlying SGBV matter. This serves to better
protect the impartiality of the court proceedings by shielding the parties from potential future biased adjudications and avoiding parties
strategizing in response to their perception of the judge’s rulings. As
enumerated in proposed Rule 416X(b)(3)–(4), the hearing calls for
the disclosure of evidence that the parties could present during the
trial. Even if during the hearing the parties do not present evidence
that could come up again, the totality of the separate proceeding
could influence future rulings.
Triers of fact do not forget about evidence presented just because
it has not been admitted into evidence. 400 In fact, jurors tend to rationalize their judgments based on evidence excluded using the evidence admitted. 401 This integrative process is not exclusive to jurors,
as judges are susceptible to it as well. 402 Considering the adverse
effects this integrative process could have on both the defendant’s
case and the victim’s testimony, the proposed Rule 416X breaks
See id.
See supra Part II.
399
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–94
(1993) (explaining the factors a court must consider to determine if an expert is
qualified before allowing him to testify).
400
See Kassin & Sommers, supra note 58, at 1053.
401
Id.; see also Studebaker & Penrod, supra note 58, at 257.
402
See St. Joan, supra note 131, at 282 (“Ample evidence indicates that many
judges adopt the dominant cultural myths about domestic violence and fail to understand the common experiences of abused women. Some judges deeply resist
evidence that could challenge their cultural beliefs about domestic violence.”).
397
398
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away from the fiction that judges, contrary to jurors, would be able
to compartmentalize the information and ignore the evidence that
has not been admitted.
By having a different judge decide the admissibility of the evidence of specific acts of untruthfulness, the Rule seeks to preserve
the impartiality and fairness needed for the decision-making process. Under the proposed Rule, the court, during the separate hearing, would hear any relevant extrinsic evidence. In order to avoid
the trier of fact’s rulings being unfairly influenced by the information presented at this previous admissibility hearing—while also
protecting the privacy of the victim—the Rule requires that the hearing is conducted by a separate judge or magistrate and that the record, motions, and related materials be sealed.
This has the added benefit of preventing the parties from adapting their trial strategies to fit the parties’ perception of the judge’s
disposition simply based on what the judge ruled at the preliminary
admissibility hearing. For example, the parties will not have to decide whether to ask the judge to recuse himself because it appears
that the evidence discussed during the hearing could influence his
rulings during the trial. In that way, parties will not have to enter
into a cost-benefit analysis about losing political capital with the
judge by moving to recuse him. In addition, the parties will not have
to consider how certain evidence that was not discussed during the
hearing will play out in light of what transpired during the previous
proceeding. The sealed nature of the preliminary admissibility hearing, as well as the use of a second, independent judge, allows the
parties to maintain a clean slate with the actual trial judge.
These safeguards make the procedures in Rule 416X different
from those under Tennessee’s Rule of Evidence 608. Tennessee’s
Rule of Evidence 608 calls for a determination that “the alleged conduct has probative value and that a reasonable factual basis exists
for the inquiry.” Contrary to Rule 416X, this procedure does not entail presenting evidence that could not be introduced during the trial.
Thus, the proposed Rule 416X protects the impartiality of the upcoming proceedings.
A similar reasoning explains the safeguards Rule 416X provides
that are not available at a Daubert hearing, 403 namely that a Rule
403

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993).
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416X hearing must be presided over by a different judge. The purpose of a Daubert hearing is to determine whether the expert meets
the requisite level of qualifications and that the testimony is based
on reliable methodologies. 404 In essence, a Daubert hearing can be
compared to a more stringent voir dire of the witness that is removed
from the presence of the jury to prevent misleading them. However,
even if the court, contrary to Rule 416X, is never asked to hear evidence that is excluded from trial, parties could theoretically delve
into matters that may later come up in trial during an expert’s voir
dire. Yet, what is being ascertained in the Daubert hearing is how
to interpret facts that are already part of the record. 405 On the other
hand, the procedure of proposed Rule 416X seeks to determine if
the evidence regarding the credibility of the witness who is providing relevant testimony should be admitted. As a result, the extent of
what the court is doing in a Daubert hearing is vastly different from
a Rule 416X hearing.
The Daubert hearing decides the admissibility of an expert’s interpretation by looking at her qualifications and methodology. 406
Once the court determines that an expert’s interpretation of the facts
should not be heard, that interpretation of the facts will have no bearing on the case. 407 And if the expert testimony is admitted, the court
essentially makes a determination that the testimony should be considered by the jury. 408 This implies that there is no real issue of the
judge’s future rulings being unfairly colored by the hearing.
Rule 416X, in contrast, is looking at evidence that affects the
credibility of a witness. The risk of contaminating the judge with
evidence that could later be determined to have no bearing on the
credibility of the witness is therefore always present and could affect
either of the parties in unpredictable ways. 409 This critical difference
between the Daubert hearing and the hearing under Rule 416X warrants that the latter needs to be presided over by a different judge as
opposed to the former, which does not necessarily need a separate
judge.
Id. at 592–94.
Id. at 591–92.
406
Id. at 592–94.
407
See id. at 597.
408
See id. at 595.
409
See Epstein & Goodman, supra note 93, at 405 (noting how judges tend to
disbelieve victims of SGBV).
404
405
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3. REALIGNMENT OF ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR ACTS WITH
ADMISSIBILITY OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS
The Rule also tries to harmonize impeachment by character for
untruthfulness evidence using specific non-criminal untruthful acts
with impeachment by prior convictions. As discussed, these are both
technically specific acts, which only differ as to the criminality of
the act and the prior judicial determination that the act has occurred. 410 For that reason, the proposed Rule employs a different
balancing test for prior convictions because that type of specific acts
evidence is generally perceived as more reliable than specific acts
of non-criminal untruthfulness evidence. 411 However, there is no
reason to have two different standards regarding the time span required for admission or whether the evidence is subject to FRE 403
analysis. Accordingly, the proposed Rule departs from the FRE by
subjecting all prior convictions for crimen falsi (in non-SGBV
cases) to a FRE 403 analysis and by limiting the use of both prior
acts of untruthfulness and prior convictions to a time limit of five
years.
The Rule rejects the FRE’s idea that prior acts of untruthfulness
could be admissible irrespective of when they occurred, while prior
convictions could be admissible only if they are not older than ten
years. 412 It is counterintuitive to limit impeachment with a prior conviction and not limit it as to a prior bad act whose criminality is less
and to which the witness has no incentive of remembering. 413 Because of the lack of incentive to remember a non-serious, prior bad
act, 414 the Rule limits its use to acts within the last five years, so that
the witness could have a better memory when responding to the impeachment.

Compare FED. R. EVID. 608(b), with FED. R. EVID. 609.
See Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, supra note 28, at 179–86 (discussing the use of reputation and opinion evidence over time and the reliance on such
evidence); Gold, supra note 268, at 774 (“Of the four types of witness evidence,
[noncriminal] misconduct evidence provides the weakest basis for making a generalization about truthfulness.”).
412
Compare FED. R. EVID. 608, with FED. R. EVID. 609.
413
Gold, supra note 268, at 775.
414
Id.
410
411
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4. COUNSEL FOR VICTIM
In addition, the proposed Rule provides for the appointment of a
victim’s counsel in cases in which the interests of the victim are not
adequately represented. This addition of a possible trilateral process
is based on the recognition that the objectives of prosecutors and
victims diverge greatly in terms of the protection of victims’ privacy, impeachment of victims, and standards for measuring the success of the case. 415 Professor Lininger poignantly describes these
tensions by stating
prosecutors do not share victims’ sense of urgency in
protecting against disclosure of sensitive personal information. Prosecutors are generally very cautious
about making evidentiary objections. They fear objections will signal to jurors that the government has
something to hide. Another reason why prosecutors
may forego valid objections is that by giving defense
counsel wide leeway, prosecutors eliminate possible
appellate grounds. Prosecutors have an ethical and
constitutional obligation to disclose material that undermines the credibility of the prosecution’s witnesses. Cynical prosecutors may believe that defense
harassment of accusers is helpful because it may outrage the jury and increase the likelihood of conviction. Victims, on the other hand, have no ethical obligation to be forthright about their foibles, and they
have a much stronger interest in privacy.
There is a second reason why the bilateral adversarial
model inaccurately describes the relationship between prosecutors and victims: The government frequently impeaches accusers. . . . The convergence of
“no drop” policies and stricter confrontation requirements make such impeachment far more likely than
in the past. 416

415
416

that:

Lininger, supra note 241, at 1394.
Id. at 1394–95. In addition to those reasons, Professor Lininger also adds
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Considering these tensions, it is important that the victims have
a mechanism to make sure that events that might have no bearing to
the cause of action do not come up and that someone protects the
victim from such inquiries. 417 We currently lack such a mechanism
in SGBV cases, and the Rule seeks to correct that by providing counsel for the victim at the hearing and during the trial. Even if the hearing does serve as an incentive for the prosecution to defend the interests and privacy of the victim, the prosecutor might have a strategy that does not guarantee that victims would be protected from
impeachment to her character for untruthfulness. 418 For that reason,
the possibility of a trilateral process is of utmost importance if the
system seeks to correct the problems of under-prosecution. 419 This
representation should also extend to civil cases when the victims are

One final reason for the discordant relationship between the
prosecutor and the accuser is the different standard by which
the two groups measure the success of a prosecution. Prosecutors have a short-term perspective. They focus on the jury verdict and the length of the sentence. A guilty verdict and a long
sentence mean that the prosecution has prevailed; an acquittal
or a short sentence brings disappointment. Prosecutors have
other ancillary concerns such as managing huge caseloads and
maintaining good relationships with repeat players in criminal
court, but their primary concern is the “scorecard” of convictions and jail time. The accuser, for her part, has a far different
gauge for measuring the success of a prosecution. A prosecution is successful for the accuser if it facilitates her long-term
emotional recovery, strengthens her sense of self-determination, and leaves open the possibility of rebuilding interpersonal
relationships (perhaps even with the defendant). In addition, the
victim hopes that the prosecution will improve – or at least not
limit – the odds of success in parallel civil litigation; prosecutors are subject to ethical rules that prohibit them from taking
actions to assist civil proceedings, and prosecutors typically regard parallel civil litigation as a nuisance that hinders the attainment of prosecutorial goals.
Id. at 1395–96.
417
For example, a trilateral process could have helped Jennifer when she felt
that the prosecutor was not interested in defending her interest. See supra Part I.
418
See Lininger, supra note 241, at 1394–95.
419
As Professor Lininger suggests, the trilateral process should be a possibility in every SGBV case and even more extensive than the processes proposed
here. Lininger, supra note 241, at 1396.
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proceeding pro se, as a way to level the playing field and avoid undue revictimization.
The Rule, however, does not protect against the revictimization
that can happen due to the prosecution’s impeachment of the victim
because of no-drop prosecutions or declaration of the victim as a
hostile witness. 420 Rule 416X only operates when an opposing party
impeaches an SGBV victim’s character for truthfulness and in no
other context. This would allow jurisdictions that believe no-drop
prosecution rules are necessary to continue that practice. 421
5. NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENT
Further, the Rule attempts to make the proceedings as fair as
possible by requiring the defendant to notify the prosecution or the
victim of his intention to use evidence of specific acts of untruthfulness and list the acts intended to be used. Part of the problem with
using specific acts of untruthfulness is that contrary to other forms
of character for untruthfulness evidence, “to the extent that misconduct evidence is weak or even misleading, the witness [the victim]
may be ill prepared to explain the defects of that evidence.” 422 Giving the victim the opportunity to rebut the evidence puts the court in
a better position to weigh the probative value of the evidence of
character for untruthfulness against its prejudicial effects. In criminal cases, the Rule seeks to balance the right to confrontation with
the notification requirement, by providing that the defendant has until the commencement of the trial to file the motion and notify the
prosecution and the victim before waiving his right to use this evidence. Finally, as a corollary of the trilateral process, the Rule provides for the motion to be sent directly to the victim, this way the
victim can decide whether to initiate the trilateral process.
In sum, the Rule respects the reliance our evidentiary system
grants to character evidence for untruthfulness and the right of confrontation while making trials of SGBV cases fairer by preventing
attorneys from accessing biased narratives about victims’ lack of
credibility and using them as part of their defense.
Id. at 1362.
However, as Professor Lininger advocates, these jurisdictions should incorporate the trilateral process at least for proceedings in which the interests of
the victims collide with those of the prosecution. Id. at 1395–96.
422
Gold supra, note 268, at 775.
420
421
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D. Proposed Rule for Impeachment in Action
Applying the Rule to Jennifer’s case 423 shows how the Rule
could affect outcomes and shield the process from biases. In Jennifer’s case, the evidence regarding the lies on Facebook, the loan
application, the use of a married name, and the extra-marital pregnancy constitute prior acts of untruthfulness. Thus, the admissibility
of such evidence would be a matter to be adjudicated during the separate hearing established in Rule 416X. However, the evidence of
bias (divorce and future litigation), contradiction (Facebook posts
not showing bad moments and car buying), perception (mental
health and drug use), and lack of verification (no previous police
reports and no reporting to friends or family) would not be subject
to the hearing procedure established in Rule 416X as they are not
specific acts of untruthfulness. That means that the defendant would
be able to introduce that evidence subject to FRE 403X and FRE
608X.
When the court considers the evidence of Jennifer’s prior acts
under Rule 416X, it should conclude that all of the specific acts in
Jennifer’s case should be excluded. The defense has four acts to
show that Jennifer has a character for untruthfulness. However, the
court should not only consider the quantity of specific acts but how
probative these acts are of the victim lying. In Jennifer’s case, two
of the four acts are inconsequential acts of untruthfulness related to
social expectations that do not tell the court whether a person would
lie in a judicial proceeding. For the most part, people do not air their
problems on social media; rather, they portray the good aspects of
their lives. 424 It can be said that because people only portray the
good aspects of their lives, it follows that they know others are doing
the same. 425
The same can be said about Jennifer using a married name when
she was not legally married. This conduct may just reflect a desire

See supra Part I.
Helmut Appel et al., The Interplay Between Facebook Use, Social Comparison, Envy, and Depression, 9 CURRENT OPINION PSYCHOL. 44, 44 (2016)
(stating that “[i]n [ ] Facebook profiles, users communicate abundant social comparison information conveying mainly positive self-portrayals.”).
425
See id.
423
424

92

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:1

to keep matters about one’s love live private. 426 Again, this is conduct that people would likely not attach much meaning to in terms
of a person’s character for untruthfulness, especially because unmarried people can struggle to find words to properly describe the
specific contours of their relationships. 427
In contrast, people would likely attach more meaning to someone’s infidelity when assessing that person’s character for untruthfulness. 428 Common sense dictates that the average juror would
probably think it is more deceitful to be unfaithful to a spouse than
it is to lie on Facebook or lie about one’s civil marital status. Yet, in
Jennifer’s case the conduct is not even that meaningful in terms of
deceit because the alleged “infidelity” took place when the couple
had already parted ways—conduct that people would find more acceptable because a relationship has effectively ended. 429 Thus, this
evidence should not be admissible to impeach Jennifer’s character
for truthfulness.
Consequently, the court in Jennifer’s case has only one specific
act of untruthfulness to consider: the loan application. This is an act
that could speak to a person’s character for untruthfulness and can
lead a juror to think that a witness might lie in court. However, in
order to admit the evidence for impeachment purposes, the court
should examine the available extrinsic evidence and verify that there
is some proof that such a specific act occurred. If it turns out that the
426
See Elizabeth Weil, Unmarried Spouses Have a Way with Words, N.Y.
TIMES, (Jan. 4, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/06/fashion/unmarriedspouses-have-a-way-with-words.html.
427
Id.
428
Because infidelity inherently encompasses lying, common sense would
dictate that a juror would attach more meaning to infidelity when assessing a witness’s truthfulness. However, courts have routinely prohibited the introduction of
this evidence as being more prejudicial than probative. See, e.g., United States v.
Thiongo, 344 F.3d 55, 60 (1st Cir. 2003) (“Evidence Defendant bore the man’s
child while married to another does not appear to be relevant or probative of Defendant’s truthfulness or untruthfulness.”); United States v. Stone, 472 F.2d 909,
916 (5th Cir. 1973) (“Attempted impeachment of [witness] by proof of [marital]
infidelity would have been impermissible.”).
429
See generally Jessica Blankenship, What Does and Does Not Count as
Cheating, THOUGHT CATALOG (Jan. 3, 2014), https://thoughtcatalog.com/jessicablankenship/2014/01/what-does-and-does-not-count-as-cheating/(discussing
how it is not considered cheating to move on when partners decide to go “on a
break”).
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defense has extrinsic evidence that gives it a reasonable basis to ask
about the loan application, the court should also inquire as to the
remoteness of the act. In this case, the loan application seems to be
from six years prior to the current proceedings in Jennifer’s case.
The proposed Rule looks at evidence of acts older than five years
with distrust. The weight of the evidence of distrust should be diminished by the lack of evidence regarding previous allegations of
SGBV. Thus, the evidence of the loan application should be excluded as its probative value is at most, closely balanced by the unfair prejudice to the victim’s testimony, and the Rule would require
exclusion in such a close case.
It could have been different if there were prior criminal or administrative accusations of SGBV that were recanted or not proven;
if those recanted or prior accusations could not be explained by Jennifer; if the prior act of untruthfulness was more recent; and if the
defense had witnesses of reputation speaking of Jennifer’s character
for untruthfulness, then the court’s conclusion about the admissibility of the loan application may have been different. The court probably would allow the impeachment of Jennifer with the loan application had those other factors been present. Nevertheless, the impeachment would be limited to show that Jennifer lied in the loan
application. According to Rule 416X, the examination about that act
should be limited to whether the witness engaged in the prior act of
untruthfulness.
Therefore, in Jennifer’s case none of the specific acts should be
used to impeach her character for truthfulness. As a result, the defense would only be able to impeach her using the evidence of bias,
contradiction, perception, and lack of verification. During the trial,
some of that admissible evidence that exposes customary victim behavior would have been explained by Jennifer in her testimony or
by expert witnesses. However, with the lack of evidence regarding
specific acts of untruthfulness, the defense would have been precluded from accessing the biases discussed in Part II. This would
prevent the defense from unfairly discounting Jennifer’s credibility
and in turn, would make the adjudication of Jennifer’s case fairer
and more accurate.
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V. #EVERYDAYSEXISM: OBJECTIONS TO SPECIFIC IMPEACHMENT
RULES FOR SGBV VICTIMS
Well, it’s a tough thing going on. If you can be an exemplary
person for 35 years, and then somebody comes and they say you did
this or that, and they give three witnesses, and the three witnesses—
at this point—do not corroborate what she was saying. It’s a very
scary situation where you’re guilty until proven innocent. My whole
life, my whole life I’ve heard you’re innocent until proven guilty, but
now you’re guilty until proven innocent. That is a very, very difficult
standard. . . .Well I say that it’s a very scary time for young men in
America when you can be guilty of something that you may not be
guilty of. 430
Even if the proposal of this Article is a more sensible way to
tackle some of the issues that victims of SGBV confront, potential
detractors of the proposal would argue that it is not needed. They
might argue that even if it is needed, it could create other problems
such as curtailing the rights of defendants, it could lead to over-conviction of false accusations, and it could overburden the judicial system. Furthermore, detractors might criticize the proposal as not gender specific when it tries to attend to issues of SGBV, that it responds to an unfounded SGBV exceptionalism, or that it could be
resolved by abolishing the use of character for untruthfulness evidence. However, these objections are meritless.
First, there is a serious problem with the adjudication of SGBV
cases and victim’s and women’s credibility biases. 431 Some detractors might argue that if there is a problem it could be attended with

CNN, President Trump: Scary Time for Young Men in America, YOUTUBE
(Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qUEBZmuzYQM (President
Trump talking to reporters outside of the White House at 6:39–7:29); see also
Monique Judge, Opinion, When Donald Trump Says ’It’s a Scary Time for Young
Men in America,’ He Means Young White Men, ROOT (Oct. 2, 2018, 8:01
PM), https://www.theroot.com/when-donald-trump-says-its-a-scary-time-foryoung-men-i-1829479262.
431
See supra Part II.
430

2019]

EVIDENCE’S #METOO MOMENT

95

instructions to the jurors. 432 Those instructions exist today. 433 Most
instructions tell jurors that just because a juror does not believe part
of the testimony of a witness does not mean that the juror should not
give credence to the rest of the witness’s testimony. 434 However, as
discussed supra Part II, jurors are not able to compartmentalize evidence in that way. 435 Even Professor Bennett Capers, a proponent
of jury instructions, recognizes that rethinking the Rules of Evidence
to cover functional evidence is consistent with the overall goals of
the Rules. 436
Regarding the other objections the Rule’s detractors might have,
they are not actual problems. But rather, except for the SGBV exceptionalism critique, they might be an extension of the biases discussed associated with these types of cases.
A. Defendants’ Rights
Detractors might argue that the Rule erodes the right of confrontation of defendants in criminal cases and that it shifts the burden of
proof, by automatically believing the victims’ allegations. 437 Yet,
See Capers, Evidence Without Rules, supra note 29, at 898–900 (arguing
for jury instructions that instruct jurors to disregard functional evidence considered by jurors, such as race and clothes); but see J. Alexander Tanford, The Law
and Psychology of Jury Instructions, 69 NEB. L. REV. 71, 95 (“The empirical research clearly demonstrates that instructions to disregard are ineffective in reducing the harm caused by inadmissible evidence and improper arguments.”).
433
See, e.g., PENNSYLVANIA SUGGESTED STANDARD CRIMINAL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS 4.15 (3rd ed. 2016).
434
An example of this type of instruction is the following:
If you decide that a witness deliberately testified falsely about
a material point, [that is, about a matter that could affect the
outcome of this trial,] you may for that reason alone choose to
disbelieve the rest of his or her testimony. But you are not required to do so. You should consider not only the deliberate
falsehood but also all other factors bearing on the witness’s
credibility in deciding whether to believe other parts of [his]
[her] testimony.
Id.
435
See Kassin & Sommers, supra note 58, at 1053.
436
Capers, Evidence Without Rules, supra note 29, at 900–01.
437
See Colb, The Difference Between, supra note 54 (arguing that prosecutors
can oftentimes secure a conviction solely with eye-witness testimony and that “jurors [need] to presume innocence until they hear credible evidence proving guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.”); see also Sherry Colb, What Does #BelieveWomen
432
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what the Rule intends to do is to make sure that the evidence used
to impeach the victims is relevant. The Rule does not exclude evidence that has been shown to be relevant, even where the reliability
of such evidence has been doubted. Because the Rule only excludes
evidence that is not relevant, the right of confrontation of the defendant is not violated.
The defendant does not have a right to introduce evidence that
is not relevant. 438 Moreover, the Rule protects the right of confrontation by providing a hearing to elucidate the relevancy of evidence
whose probative value has been called into question. Similarly, the
defendant, as in Jennifer’s case, 439 still has at his disposal impeachment with evidence of bias, contradiction, perception, and lack of
verification; focusing on the actual lies rather than on a witness’s
status as a liar.
Moreover, the argument that the Rule subverts the burden of
proof by giving full credence to the victim and assuming the defendant is guilty unless proven otherwise is a fallacy. 440 The Rule does
no such a thing. Such an objection is based on some of the narratives
associated with the “he said/she said” credibility bias. 441 The Rule
merely requires the defendant to assert the relevancy of the evidence
to be used to impeach the victim. The factors used for that determination do not assume that the victim is telling the truth about the
events or that the defendant is guilty of the charges. What the Rule
does is balance factors to ascertain whether the evidence could be

Mean?, YONKERS TRIB., (Nov.7, 2018, 1:45 PM), https://www.yonkerstribune.com/2018/11/what-does-believewomen-mean-by-sherry-f-colb.
438
See, e.g., Roundtree v. United States, 581 A.2d 315, 321 (D.C. 1990) (“Because the Constitution does not require confrontation of witnesses with irrelevant
evidence, the very applicability of the confrontation clause in this case depends
on [the victim’s] prior allegations being false. Under these circumstances, the confrontation clause does not prevent the trial court from weighing the [defendant’s]
offer of proof to determine its probative value to the trier of fact.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Brum, 923 A.2d 1068, 1074–76 (N.H. 2007) (holding that defendant was not entitled to introduce extrinsic evidence of victim’s
prior allegations of sexual assault and that the limitation on cross-examination did
not violate defendant’s state constitutional right to confrontation).
439
See supra Part I.
440
See Colb, The Difference Between, supra note 54.
441
See id.

2019]

EVIDENCE’S #METOO MOMENT

97

used to show character for untruthfulness without confusing the jurors about the matter at trial. Therefore, the Rule does not violate
any constitutional rights of the defendant.
B. Over-Conviction of False Accusations
Criticisms that the proposed Rule will result in over-convictions
are also unwarranted. While the Rule is intended to correct the problem of under-conviction and under-adjudication in favor of victims, 442 that does not mean that the Rule will shift the balance to the
opposite side to over-conviction. Even though the Rule does make
it easier to obtain convictions, it does so in light of the current
scheme that makes it extremely hard. Moreover, the Rule does not
change any burden of proof or substantive elements of SGBV causes
of actions. Consequently, there should be no shift to over-convictions.
This objection seems to be based more on biases about victims
in SGBV cases lying or trying to advance future litigation in divorce
or child custody and support cases. 443 However, statistics contradict
See The Criminal Justice System: Statistics, supra note 8.
See Scheppele, supra note 21, at 170 (explaining that women are perceived
as liars when they revise their stories, despite revisionism being a part of the coping process); Trepiccione, supra note 240, at 1490–91 (discussing how battered
mothers are oftentimes charged with neglect and lose custody of their children).
Another reason that serves to explain the perception that victims in SGBV cases
are lying is that victims do not usually conform their stories to the legal standards,
which in turn leads to intensive fact-finding from law enforcement, attorneys, or
judges leading them to think that victims are lying or fabricating facts. See Epstein
& Goodman, supra note 93, at 418–19. As Professors Epstein and Goodman explain:
survivors often frame their courtroom stories in a way that fails
to fit the expectations of most judges, and even of the law itself:
what may feel to victims like the most insidious and intimate
brand of abuse can come across to legal gatekeepers as something that really doesn’t count as abuse at all.
The result is what philosophers call a serious “epistemic asymmetry” between marginally situated survivors and the judges
who serve as their audience . . . .
It is often only after aggressive judicial questioning that survivors volunteer information about physical abuse or threats, and
when they do, they may sound—to the judges, at any rate—less
concerned about those aspects of their stories than about the
day-to-day psychic harms they have endured. In this context,
442
443
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these impressions. The prevalence of false reporting is low; 444 it is
estimated that false reporting lies between two and ten percent. 445
For example, a study of eight communities in the United States
found the rate of false reporting as seven percent. 446 In another study
of sexual assault cases, the reported rate of false reports was
5.9%. 447 These statistics, combined with the low rates of adjudication, 448 suggest that it is very unlikely that a rule that focuses only
on the determination of relevancy of evidence for character for untruthfulness would have the effect of over-convicting defendants.
The Rule proposed in this Article attempts to better determine
whether a victim truly has a character for untruthfulness. In other
words, the Rule should serve to better identify the victims that are
actually lying. Consequently, the problem of over-conviction should
not be an issue because the Rule would actually try to help weed out
the cases involving false allegations.
The potential argument that the proposed Rule would promote
victims misusing allegations of SGBV to better their chances in separate future litigations is likewise unwarranted. The proposed Rule
does not facilitate the conviction or adjudication of false allegations.
Thus, there is no incentive to bring false charges because they would
likely be barred by the proposed Rule.

Id.

the admission of physical abuse can sound to judges like something of an afterthought. Because so many judges do not understand survivors’ frames for their experiences, they may suspect
that women’s too-little, too-late testimony about physical violence is either exaggerated or fabricated out of whole cloth; that
they are adding it only after belatedly realizing that the law demands such facts.

See, e.g., id.
Id.
446
KIMBERLY LONSWAY ET AL., FALSE REPORTS: MOVING BEYOND THE ISSUE
TO SUCCESSFULLY INVESTIGATE AND PROSECUTE NON-STRANGER SEXUAL
ASSAULT, NAT’L SEXUAL VIOLENCE RES. CTR. 2 (2009), https://www. nsvrc.
org/sites/default/files/publications/2018-10/Lisak-False-Reports-Moving-beyond.pdf.
447
David Lisak et al., False Allegations of Sexual Assault: An Analysis of Ten
Years of Reported Cases, 16 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1318, 1329 (2010).
448
See The Criminal Justice System: Statistics, supra note 8.
444
445
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Furthermore, the outcome of an SGBV case has no bearing on
the outcome of most divorce proceedings. 449 Similarly, SGBV allegations have little effect in most alimony determinations. 450 In terms
of child custody and support cases, statistics show that victims of
SGBV are actually more likely to lose custody after making assertions of violence against another. 451 In fact, in some states, bringing
a case of SGBV against a spouse or a cohabitant could be used
against the victim in custody determination based on the idea that
the victim endangered the child by staying in the relationship and
not reporting the violence. 452 However, some states have presumptions for joint custody that are enforced even in cases of intimate
449
First, with the advent of no-fault divorce, a great percentage of jurisdictions
no longer consider fault in property division distribution unless the abuse was
egregious. See id. Other states that still consider fault do so only if spousal abuse
constitutes economic fault (i.e., the economic impact that the abuse may have had
on medical bills or decreased ability to work), while other jurisdictions demand a
connection between the abuse and some other factor. Id. Finally, some states consider spousal abuse as a relevant factor in and of itself. Id. Therefore, the argument
that victims use SGBV cases to enhance their chances in divorce litigation ignores
the multiarray of how fault plays into property division determinations. It also
disregards that marriage rates continue to decrease. See Marriage Rate in the
United States from 1990 to 2017 (per 1,000 of population), STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/195951/marriage-rate-in-the-united-statessince-1990/ (last visited Sept. 17, 2019). Likewise, the argument overlooks that
there would only be an incentive to institute an SGBV case to affect the outcome
of a divorce settlement in cases where the parties actually have substantial assets
to divide, which might not be majority of cases. See Stacy Francis, Money Stress
Traps Many Women into Staying in Unhappy Marriages, CNBC (Aug. 13, 2019),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/13/money-stress-traps-many-women-into-staying-in-unhappy-marriages.html.
450
See Mary Kay Kisthardt, Re-Thinking Alimony: The AAML’s Considerations for Calculating Alimony, Spousal Support or Maintenance, 21 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIM. LAW. 61, 68 (2008) (“With the advent of no-fault divorce, alimony [has]
also lost its punitive rationale.”); see also THE HOUSE OF RUTH MD. DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE LEGAL CLINIC ET AL., DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES: HANDLING THEM
EFFECTIVELY IN MARYLAND DISTRICT AND CIRCUIT COURTS 144–45 (2019) (discussing how alimony awards in Maryland consider domestic violence, under the
estrangement factor, because alimony is based on financial need and not punitive).
451
Epstein & Goodman, supra note 93, at 431. Shockingly, abusive parents
are more likely to seek sole custody and succeed at a rate of seventy percent. 10
Myths About Custody and Domestic Violence and How to Counter Them, A.B.A.
COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, (2006),
http://leadershipcouncil.org/docs/ABA_custody_myths.pdf.
452
Aiken & Murphy, supra note 61, at 51.
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partner violence. 453 Thus, married or partnered women are actually
disincentivized to allege SGBV allegations if the women are also
planning on litigating any of these family law matters in the future.
C. Burden to the Judicial System
Regarding the potential objection to the proposed Rule that it
burdens an already burdened system, 454 the detractors would be justified in pointing out that requiring a separate hearing would increase the costs for the judicial system, the costs for the parties, and
the time that it would take to resolve a matter. However, a cost-benefit analysis shows that the benefits of adopting the proposed Rule
outweigh its costs. For instance, making sure that the system accounts for the patriarchal biases and attempts to correct those biases
by delivering more accurate outcomes in cases of SGBV is an extremely valuable benefit. The under-prosecution of SGBV is a significant problem. 455 Adopting the proposed Rule could help fix
some of the problems associated with such under-prosecution and
promote the notion that women and victims of this type of violence
matter. Refusal to reform or start to fix some of these problems only
reifies the issues of looking at victims of this type of violence as
people who do not count.

Judith G. Greenberg, Domestic Violence and the Danger of Joint Custody
Presumptions, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 403, 428 (2005).
454
See, e.g., Joe Palazzolo, In Federal Courts, the Civil Cases Pile Up, WALL
ST. J. (Apr. 6, 2015, 2:09 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-federal-courtscivil-cases-pile-up-1428343746 (“Civil suits . . . are piling up in some of the nation’s federal courts, leading to long dealys in cases involving Social Security
benefits, personal injury and civil rights, among others.”).
455
See The Criminal Justice System: Statistics, supra note 8. For example,
under-prosecution of intimate partner violence can negatively impact the economy because women are not able to fully participate in the job market. See NAT’L
COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, https://www.
speakcdn.com/assets/2497/domestic_violence2.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2019).
“Victims of intimate partner violence lose a total of 8,000,000 million days of
paid work each year. . . . [In addition, i]ntimate partner violence is estimated to
cost the US economy between $5.8 billion and $12.6 billion annually, up to
0.125% of the national gross domestic product.” Id.
453
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Refusing to adopt the proposed Rule when the evidentiary system has adopted analogous rules in other contexts, such as with expert testimony, 456 would confirm that this is a matter of gender oppression. The only reason that could explain the adoption of a rule
in one context and not the other is the difference in whom is being
protected. This discrepancy reveals the gender biases that pervade
the legal system. Adopting this proposal would demonstrate a recognition that there is a need for reform in this area of our evidentiary
law, just as the creation of Daubert hearings served to prove that
there was a need for reform in the context of expert testimony.
On the other hand, the proposed Rule does not need to be
adopted as a whole. Jurisdictions could adopt versions that are less
burdensome. For example, a state could theoretically adopt a version
of the proposed Rule that dispenses with the trilateral process. Or a
state could adopt a version of the Rule that holds the preliminary
admissibility hearing outside the presence of the jury but that does
not require a separate judge to preside over the hearing. Another alternative could be to use the proposed Rule’s standard for specific
acts for untruthfulness of the victim but to forego the preliminary
hearing. A fourth option could be to use the most stringent standard
in the proposed Rule when assessing all forms of character for untruthfulness evidence, regardless of level of reliability.
However, as it stands today, the pervasiveness of the gender biases is so widespread 457 that some level of precautions or safeguards
is needed. Perhaps, as time passes, the biases in adjudicating these
types of cases would naturally subside and the proposed safeguards
would no longer be needed. In that case, the cost of implementing
the Rule would be high initially but it could be reduced significantly
as time passes and the biases fade. The Rule should achieve this in
two ways. First, the proposed Rule itself serves as an educational
tool to inform society of the existence of the biases discussed. Second, the safeguards put in place by the Rule should hopefully serve
as a deterrent to defendants that would otherwise try to impeach victims with evidence that would not meet the established minimum
See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 592–94
(1993) (establishing a procedure for determining whether an expert is qualified
under FRE 702 to protect parties from the admission of expert testimony based
on shoddy science).
457
See supra Part II.
456
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standards of the Rule. As the application of the Rule becomes settled
law, parties would likely start to understand when they can use specific acts of untruthfulness to impeach and when they cannot. This
would lead to a decrease in costs of implementing the Rule over time
and ultimately increase the efficiency of the judicial system.
Another way to reduce the monetary and procedural burdens of
the Rule would be to have trained judges preside over the preliminary admissibility hearings for a regular, set period of time. Optimizing the processes of the Rule, as well as developing and improving them could be a way to reduce the overall costs of the Rule.
Because the proposed Rule is so adaptable, the argument that such
a Rule merely imposes burdens on the system is just another excuse
to continue ignoring a problem that needs urgent attention.
D. No Gender Specific Rule
Detractors might also argue that the proposed Rule should not
be drafted in gender-neutral language because the Rule is supposed
to deal with a problem that disproportionately affects women. 458
First, this seems to be a contradiction. Second, there is no reason to
believe that the gender-neutral language could benefit men at the
expense of women. Such objections overestimate the scope of the
proposed Rule.
The Equal Protection Clause requires that the Rule be drafted in
gender neutral terms, unless it is substantially related to a government interest. 459 Because of the Equal Protection Clause, if the problem of impeachment using evidence of character for untruthfulness
is to be addressed, it must be done in gender-neutral terms. That does
not necessarily open the door to men to misuse the Rule in their favor. The gender-neutral language of the Rule does not mean that
458
See Number of Rape or Sexual Assault Victims in the United States per
Year from 2000 to 2017, by Gender, supra note 2 (showing that women are more
likely to be be a victim of rape or sexual assault as compared to men).
459
See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464,
475–76 (1981). A law that makes a distinction based on sex will not be upheld as
constitutional unless it is shown that the law furthers an important government
interest by means that are substantially related to that interest. See id. (upholding
a gender-based distinction in California statutory rape law that made men criminally liable for intercourse with a woman under eighteen but did not make women
liable for intercourse under any circumstance because it helped to further the important state goal of preventing teenage pregnancies).
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men could file false accusations to prevent accusations against them
or that they could use the Rule to avoid being impeached for their
own character for untruthfulness. The Rule, as discussed, does not
change any of the protections for defendants or any of the other substantive rules regarding SGBV cases. Thus, there is no need to be
preoccupied with the gender-neutral language of the rule.
In terms of the Rule being distorted by its applicability to both
male and female victims, that argument ignores that male victims
could be subjected to the same biases in the context of SGBV because of the phenomenon of feminization of victims. 460 Similar to
what happens to aggressors that are associated with male characteristics and perceived as more credible, 461 the feminization of victims
leads to the association of male victims with the biases and stereotypes typically attributed to women. 462 A perfect example of this
phenomenon is what happened to Nimrod Reitman, when he accused by his former graduate advisor, Professor Avital Ronell, of
sexually harassing him. 463 Reitman confronted the same types of attacks on his credibility that female victims are usually subjected to
in the public forum and during trial. 464
Consequently, male victims might also need to be protected under Rule 416X because of the feminization of victims that occurs in
these types of cases even when the victim is a male. 465 Thus, the

460
See Elizabeth J. Kramer, Note, When Men Are Victims: Applying Rape
Shield Laws to Male Same-Sex Rape, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 293, 308 (1998) (“[T]he
feminization of men who have been forced into sexual ‘passivity’ could make
male same-sex rape victims the object of prejudice normally reserved in our culture for women.”).
461
See supra Section II.A.1.
462
See María Victoria Carrera-Fernández et al., “Blanditos, débiles y
sumisos”: La feminización de las víctimas de bullying [Softie, Weak, and Submissive”: The Feminization of Bullying Victims], Extr. (8) REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS E
INVESTIGACIÓN EN PSICOLOGÍA Y EDUCACIÓN 40, 43 (2017) (Spain) (discussing
the feminization of bullying victims); Kramer, supra note 460, at 308 (discussing
how male same-sex rape victims are the object of prejudice reserved in our culture
for women).
463
Zoe Greenberg, What Happens to #MeToo When a Feminist is the Accused?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/13/nyregion/sexual-harassment-nyu-female-professor.html.
464
See id.
465
See Kramer, supra note 460, at 308.
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critique of the gender-neutral language as a distortion or contradiction is not justified.
E. SGBV Exceptionalism
Finally, some detractors, based on Professor Erin R. Collins’
idea of evidentiary domestic violence exceptionalism, 466 might argue that this proposed Rule encourages a similar exceptionalism and
perpetuates some of the associated harms. Specifically, Collins argues that many jurisdictions have enacted specialized evidence rules
(i.e., character evidence exceptions, relaxed forfeiture by wrongdoing rule, and hearsay exceptions) predicated on the front-end prosecutorial differential approach, 467 which disregards the lack of justifications to extend this exceptionalism to trials. She further illustrates that this evidentiary intervention is premised on a mistaken
application of the already shaky battered woman syndrome defense
and on the dominance feminism theory, which is not responsive to
the particular needs of the parties involved. 468 This practice compromises the integrity of the criminal justice system and reduces the
efficacy of the interventions by inadvertently harming and discrediting the victims who do not support prosecution. 469
However, the proposed Rule is not built on a shaky defense that
is wrongly applied in cases beyond its original scope. Instead, the
Rule is influenced by observations and analyses from various scholars as to how society discounts victims. Additionally, even if the
analysis departs from the premise that the current rule serves to reinforce the subordination of women, the Rule does not remove
choice from state actors. 470 Rather the Rule directs state choice and
tries to educate states as to the biases that have created problems.
Further, the proposed Rule does not perpetuate the harms of exceptionalism. As discussed, the use of character for untruthfulness
evidence in and of itself compromises our adjudication system by
searching for liars instead of lies. 471 The proposed Rule attempts to
Collins, supra note 260, at 414.
Id. at 412–14.
468
See id. at 408–10, 414.
469
See id. at 446–47, 452–55.
470
See id. at 408–10 (explaining how dominance feminism removes choice
from reluctant state actors).
471
See Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, supra note 28, at 221.
466
467
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correct this failure in SGBV cases where the negative effects of the
current evidentiary rules seem to be most severe. 472 The proposed
Rule is also not intended to be used against victims that do not wish
to prosecute the offender. For that reason, the Rule is not intended
to be used in cases of hostile witnesses, which is also why the Rule
opens up the possibility of a trilateral process. The goal of the Rule
is not to ease the prosecution of particular crimes, but rather to correct the imbalance of how we currently discount victims in SGBV
cases. Although the natural result of the proposed reform is a better
prosecution of the crime, better prosecution is not cause for a relaxation of the rules or special concessions during the trial.
Some might argue evidence of character for untruthfulness
should be barred altogether. 473 Yet, banning all character evidence
does not remove that evidence from coming in through judicial action. 474 In addition, reliance on this type of evidence is still very
prevalent across the country. 475 Because character evidence does not
seem to be going anywhere anytime soon in our current systems, we
have to focus instead on removing the credibility biases against
SGBV victims.
#WOMENSREALITY: CONCLUSION
The #MeToo movement is accomplishing what sexual harassment law to date has not.
This mass mobilization against sexual abuse, through an unprecedented wave of speaking out in conventional and social media,
is eroding the two biggest barriers to ending sexual harassment in
law and in life: the disbelief and trivializing dehumanization of its
victims. 476

See supra Part III.
See, e.g., Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, supra note 28, at 225.
474
See supra Section IV.A.3; see also Barrett J. Anderson, Recognizing Character: A New Perspective on Character Evidence, 121 YALE L.J. 1912, 1922
(2012) (explaining how courts oftentimes skip threshold inquiries about character
evidence, allowing evidence that would otherwise be excluded in).
475
See, e.g., Hartley, supra note 21, at 540 (stating that common defense tactics include attacking the character of a victim).
476
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Opinion, #MeToo Has Done What the Law
Could Not, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com /2018/02/04/
opinion/metoo-law-legal-system.html.
472
473
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As Catharine MacKinnon points out, the #MeToo movement is
eroding the “disbelief and trivializing dehumanization” of SGBV
victims. 477 However, as this Article explains, our evidentiary system
has systemic barriers that impede that erosion from flowing into our
judicial proceedings.
Current evidentiary rules galvanize credibility biases against
SGBV victims in trials via the introduction of evidence regarding
the victims’ character for untruthfulness. 478 Attorneys use this evidence, which in most cases is of low probative value, 479 to discount
SGBV victims. Even in jurisdictions where there are more stringent
limitations on the use of character for untruthfulness evidence,
courts carve out specific SGBV exceptions to their impeachment
rules and allow this evidence to come in and be used to attack victims’ characters. 480
This defense strategy correlates with the underreporting, underconviction, and under-favorable adjudication of SGBV cases. 481
Our current rules, that should serve to guarantee the fairness of the
judicial proceedings by discouraging the use of reprehensible tactics
and protecting witnesses from undue harassment, 482 have proven to
be insufficient to guarantee the redress of SGBV. “If we operate
with norms of credibility that do not take into account the influence
of background beliefs and of prejudice on our credibility judgments,
there is a very real risk of committing epistemic injustice.” 483 For
that reason, this Article proposes amending the current evidentiary
rules to prevent attorneys from using credibility biases associated
with trustworthiness and plausibility against SGBV victims during
trials.
The proposed Rule attempts to implement reform while still respecting the long-standing tradition of impeaching witnesses with
evidence of character for untruthfulness. The Rule is drafted so that
Id.
See supra Part II.
479
See Gold, supra note 268, at 774.
480
See, e.g., supra notes 346–53 and accompanying text.
481
See The Criminal Justice System: Statistics, supra note 8.
482
Andrew K. Dolan, Rule 403: The Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 S. CAL.
L. REV. 220, 228 (1976).
483
Karen Jones, The Politics of Credibility, in A MIND OF ONE’S OWN:
FEMINIST ESSAYS ON REASON AND OBJECTIVITY 158 (Louise Antony & Charlotte Witt eds., 2002) (emphasis added).
477
478
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it follows constitutional mandates, avoids over-correction, and promotes judicial efficiency. As a result, the Rule provides for three
different balancing tests depending on the type of character for untruthfulness evidence involved. The Rule lists concrete factors to aid
the courts in weighing the probative value of the character for untruthfulness evidence against its prejudicial effects in the context of
SGBV cases.
For evidence in the form of opinion or reputation by a witness
other than the defendant, which is perceived by society to be the
most reliable form of character for untruthfulness evidence, 484 the
balance remains the one set in FRE 403 (i.e., that the probative value
is substantially outweighed by the prejudicial effects). However, for
the less reliable types of evidence (i.e., prior convictions for crimes
other than crimen falsi and specific acts of non-criminal untruthfulness), 485 the Rule provides that impeachment with character for untruthfulness evidence would be prohibited if the probative value of
the evidence of the victim’s untruthful character is closely balanced
or outweighed by the unfair prejudice to the victim’s testimony, the
confusion regarding the issues to be adjudicated, or the possibility
of misleading the jury or the judge. Finally, for evidence in the form
of prior convictions for crimen falsi, prior convictions older than
five years, or opinion or reputation supported solely by the defendant, the Rule establishes that the balancing test would be whether
the probative value substantially outweighs the prejudicial effects.
Additionally, where the evidence of character for untruthfulness
is in the form of specific acts, the Rule requires a preliminary admissibility hearing presided over by a separate judge or magistrate.
During that hearing or when the victim testifies at trial, if the interests of the victim are not being adequately represented, the Rule provides for the appointment of an independent counsel for the victim.
With these amendments to the current impeachment rules, attorneys should be prevented from accessing credibility biases during
trial and discounting the testimony of witnesses. That, as a result,
would ameliorate the revictimization of SGBV victims, foster fairer
adjudications, and incentivize victims to come forward. This would
slowly start correcting the problems of underreporting, under-conviction, and under-favorable adjudication of SGBV cases.
484
485

See Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, supra note 28, at 179–86.
See Gold, supra note 268, at 774.
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“[T]he efficacy of the judicial decision-making process rests on
the popular belief of judicial fairness.” 486 Historically, our system
has denied that fairness to women, especially when redressing violence targeted towards them. 487 As Professor Anita Hill has pointed
out, the changes our judicial system has experienced in the redressing of SGBV claims have come glacially slow. 488 The proposal presented in this Article is hopefully one catalyst that would accelerate
that glacially slow change.

486
487
488

Dolan, supra note 482, at 228.
See supra Part II.
Last Week Tonight with John Oliver, supra note 1.

